Lucas Water Treatment Plant - Executive Summary

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Executive Summary 
 
Lucas Water Treatment Plant 
 
? Background 
Glasgow Water Company, located in Glasgow, Kentucky, operates the Lucas Water  
Treatment plant (WTP).  The facility is subject to EPAs Risk Management Program  
in accordance with Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA).  The WTP provides  
the City of Glasgow and surrounding areas with potable water for human  
consumption. 
 
? Chemical Management Program 
As a concerned member of the community, the company takes its role as a  
responsible citizen very seriously.  Glasgow Water Company facilities are operated to  
protect employees, contractors and the public from injury and illness, and to minimize  
environmental impact.  Glasgow Water Companys policy is to inspect, maintain and  
operate equipment and facilities to prevent accidents, including release of hazardous  
materials, and to train employees in prevention of accidents. 
 
Glasgow Water Company has developed and implemented Process Safety  
Management (PSM) plans at each  
operations facility as part of an overall chemical  
management program.  The program involves the Superintendents at each facility  
along with the plant operators. 
 
1) Accidental Release Prevention and Emergency Response Policies 
 
The Lucas WTP has developed a PSM plan as part of the overall chemical  
management program.  The program involves the Superintendent and all operators at  
the facility.  Lucas WTP personnel also provide safety training to staff as part of the  
accidental release prevention program. 
 
2) Description of Facility and the Regulated Substances 
 
The Lucas WTP is located on 1321 Narrows Road near Lucas, Kentucky  
approximately 10 miles southeast of Glasgow.  The Lucas WTP withdraws and treats  
water from Barren Lake for distribution of potable water to the surrounding areas. 
 
The Lucas WTP utilizes a Wallace & Tiernan vacuum operated, manual switchover,  
gaseous feed system.  Two 1-ton containers of chlorine are piped together to provide  
uninterrupted flow of chlori 
ne. 
 
The maximum inventory at the WTP includes four 1-ton chlorine containers.  Under  
normal circumstances, a full container and a container in use are piped together and  
situated on the scale apparatus and up to two full containers of chlorine are stored  
within the same room.  The maximum amount of chlorine on-site at one time would  
be less than 8,000 pounds.  Currently, the feed rate for chlorine ranges from  
approximately 100  200 pounds per day. 
 
3) Worst-Case Release Scenario 
The predicted worst-case release scenario for chlorine is a catastrophic release of one  
(full) chlorine container within the chlorination room.  This enclosure will limit the  
dispersion of both liquid and vapor to the atmosphere during a release.  For this  
scenario, 2,000 pounds of chlorine liquefied under pressure are assumed to be  
released in 10 minutes.  Using RMP*Comp Version 1.06 air dispersion modeling  
software, the distance to a toxic endpoint of 0.0087 mg/l is predicted to be 2.2 miles.   
 

s an input parameter for RMP*Comp the topography surrounding the WTP was  
considered rural.  It should be noted that this parameter is not directly correlated to  
population density.  Rather, the topography surrounding the facility is characterized  
as either having many obstructions  urban or generally flat with few obstacles   
rural.  Because the WTP is located adjacent to the lake, the surface of the water is  
considered the dominant feature in the topography surrounding the facility (see  
Section 3.3).  For this reason, the topography is considered rural. 
 
This radius encompasses approximately 345 residences, and 1 recreation facility.   
Assuming a population multiplier of 3.5 people per residence, this radius  
encompasses approximately 1,210 people.  The number of residences and other  
public and environmental receptors associated with this radius was provided by  
Glasgow Water Company personnel from GIS data using the latitude and longitude of  
the facility and a radius 
of 2.2 miles provided by EMPE. 
 
4) Alternative Release Scenarios 
The alternative release scenario for the WTP chlorination process is based on the  
events that led to a chlorine release in October 1996 as described in the Five-Year  
Accident History section of this summary.  For this scenario, a lead gasket is not  
properly installed when the vacuum regulator assembly is leak tested.  Before the  
main valve to the cylinder can be closed, chlorine gas is released, forcing WTP  
personnel to evacuate the chlorination room.  The chlorine container continues to  
release chlorine gas for one hour until the release is mitigated by emergency  
responders. 
 
This release scenario was modeled using RMP*Comp Version 1.06 software by  
assuming that the temperature and pressure of the container at the time of the leak are  
77 degrees F and 113 pounds per square inch (psi).  The release was modeled as  
discharge of gas from a 1/8 inch diameter hole (area = 0.0123 square inches) at the  
above temp and 
pressure.  Off-site consequences analysis using RMP*Comp resulted  
in a radius of impact of 0.1 miles.  Visual inspection indicates that there is a  
recreation area and 2 residences located within this radius, comprising a total  
population of 6 people. 
 
Because the specific gravity of chlorine is 2.49 (air = 1.29), chlorine vapor is more  
dense than air.  As a result, chlorine vapor may collect and/or migrate along low-lying  
areas in and around the facility.  This is particularly important due to the fact that the  
chlorination room is located immediately adjacent to Barren Lake atop the steep bank  
of the lake.  A release of chlorine gas will tend to migrate down the steep bank and  
collect on and/or migrate along the surface of the lake.   
 
Furthermore, the floor drains within the chlorination room discharge along this steep  
bank.  This results in a short circuit that would allow chlorine gas to travel directly  
from the floor drains in the chlorination room to near the lake su 
rface.  However, the  
migration of chlorine vapor in the event of an actual release will be highly dependent  
upon the atmospheric conditions and release scenario at that time of the release. 
 
5) General Accident Release Prevention Program 
The Lucas WTP maintains a Process Safety Management (PSM) of Highly  
Hazardous Chemicals plan prepared in accordance with the Occupational Health and  
Safety Administration (OSHA) regulation 29 CFR 1910.119.  The WTP also utilizes  
preventative maintenance programs for its system components.  The preventative  
maintenance program for the chlorination system is conducted in conformance with  
manufacturers recommendations. 
 
6) Five-Year Accident History 
According to Mr. Tony Turner, Lucas WTP Superintendent, there has been one  
release meeting the definition provided in Section 1.6 of this RMP within the last 5  
years.  A release of chlorine gas occurred on October 10, 1996 as WTP personnel  
were placing a new, full container on-line.   
 
According to  
Mr. Turner, a lead gasket was installed improperly as the vacuum  
regulator assembly was connected to the valve on the container.  The main valve on  
the container was briefly opened and closed in order to check for leaks when a hissing  
noise was heard at or near the valve of the container.  The chlorine gas detector alarm  
activated as the  WTP personnel quickly evacuated the chlorination room and notified  
the Glasgow Fire Department.   
 
The Hazardous Materials Response Team of the Glasgow Fire Department mobilized  
to the WTP and entered the chlorination room within approximately 45 minutes to 1  
hour of notification.  Mr. Turner indicated that the atmosphere of the chlorine room  
was monitored by the emergency responders prior to entry and chlorine gas was not  
detected.  The valve on the suspect container was found completely turned off, and  
the hissing noise was not observed. 
 
A total of five people were evacuated from the immediate area, including WTP  
personnel and residents  
present in two houses located on the WTP property.  Also, a  
portion of Barren Lake was secured by emergency responders such that recreational  
boats could not come within approximately 0.25 miles of the WTP.  Mr. Turner  
indicated that the emergency responders determined that a small amount of chlorine  
gas (estimated at 2 pounds) was released from the leak of a small section of piping  
that had been pressurized during the leak test, rather than from the container itself.   
There was no foliage damage, fish kill, property damage, human illness or other  
injury associated with this release. 
 
7) Emergency Response Program 
The Lucas WTP has implemented an Emergency Action Plan in accordance with  
OSHA PSM regulations.  The facility will rely on the Glasgow Fire Department to  
respond in the event of a hazardous material release, fire or other emergency  
situation.  The written Emergency Action Plan contains specific information  
regarding evacuation and notification procedures in the eve 
nt of a catastrophic  
chlorine release. 
 
The Glasgow Fire Department has conducted a reconnaissance of the facility and  
trained personnel are ready to respond if requested. 
 
8) Planned Changes to Improve Safety 
 
The Lucas WTP is in the process of implementing safety improvements as  
recommended in the Process Safety Management program.  The improvements  
should be completed by July 1, 2000. 
 
Glasgow Water\Reports\WTP RMP ExecSum.doc
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