Polonio Pass Water Treatment Plant - Executive Summary

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RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
Overview 
Since design and construction work commenced for the Polonio Pass Water Treatment Plant (PPWTP) Coastal Branch Extension of the State Water Project, the Central Coast Water Authority (CCWA) has been active in minimizing environmental impacts and protecting the environment.  In fact, these words appear in our mission statement.  It is CCWA's intent to prevent accidental releases of hazardous materials through a comprehensive program of training, preventive maintenance and proper use of materials and equipment.  Should an accidental release occur, CCWA will continue to be prepared to control and mitigate all resultant occurrences. 
 
System Description 
Although the Risk Management Plan specifically refers only to chlorine (utilized as a potable water disinfectant), CCWA has taken several measures to insure proper containment of all bulk chemicals used at the PPWTP.  All bulk chemical containers are securely fastened to concrete pedestals a 
nd have full secondary containment.  Separate containment is specified for acids and bases.  Additionally, all chemical feed lines are in secondary containment conduits that empty back to the main secondary containment structures.  Feed systems and tank data are monitored by a SCADA system with full alarm capability.  High priority alarms are audible with automatic phone and pager call out capability when acknowledgement does not occur within a specified time frame.  All equipment is tracked using automated preventive maintenance software.  Each critical piece of equipment is backed up with standby equipment in ready to run mode.  
 
The chlorine system has been designed to minimize the potential for chlorine release.  Chlorine is fed from one ton cylinders using the gas connection point on the cylinders.  Using this configuration limits chlorine draw to 400 pounds per day (faster withdrawals will freeze the valve and manifold, further limiting withdrawal rates).  Immediately after leavi 
ng the cylinders, the chlorine system converts to a vacuum system.  Any leaks in a vacuum system draw ambient air into the lines instead of allowing chlorine to escape.  A leak in the vacuum system also shuts down the chlorination system and alarms staff.   
 
The two rooms not protected by vacuum are equipped with a chlorine scrubber system.  This system neutralizes a chlorinous atmosphere by pumping the contaminated air out of the rooms and scrubbing it through a column of caustic soda (the chemical reaction of chlorine and caustic soda forms salt).  This system is capable of neutralizing an entire one ton cylinder of chlorine.   
 
Training 
Training is also an important aspect of preparedness.  Appropriate staff members are trained to the first responder awareness (FRA) or operator (FRO) levels to react to hazardous releases.  However, the San Luis County HAZMAT Team is the organization that will respond to a chlorine gas leak, with CCWA operators to act as technical assistants to the I 
ncident Commander (See ER below). The CCWA provides opportunities for CDF staff to train at the PPWTP site.  Additionally, CCWA staff members review safe chlorine handling, "B" kit use, hazardous materials response and other safety-related topics on an annual basis.  The next training session is scheduled for 29 June 1999.  
 
Emergency Response Summary 
CCWA policy dictates that any releases beyond small gasket or valve packing leaks will be handled by a multi-agency hazardous materials response unit.  This unit is comprised of various San Luis Obispo County (SLOC) fire departments and the California Department of Forestry (CDF). Routine coordination also takes place with the California Highway Patrol, and the SLOC Environmental Health Department.  Since the PPWTP is very close to the Kern County line, HAZMAT team from Lost Hills will be contacted, if required for backup, by the SLOC HAZAT team. 
 
If an emergency arises at the PPWTP, "911" will be dialed and the nature of the incident wil 
l be relayed to the emergency operator.  The response to the emergency will be determined by the problem parameters.  CDF from the Shandon Station will be the initial responders, with other units and technical advisers dispatched as required.   
 
Except for very small leaks, as noted above, the CCWA staff will wait for the county HAZMAT team to respond and assume the roles of Incident Commander, decontamination team, etc.  CCWA staff will consult with and advise the incident commander assigned to the site.   
 
PPWTP staff have been trained on the proper response to a chlorine leak, including all information necessary to provide during the initial 911 call, advised of evacuation procedures, as well as personal safety and medical procedures to be followed for exposure to chlorine gas.
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