Boeing/Rocketdyne SSFL APTF - Executive Summary |
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Accidental Release Prevention and Emergency Response Policies at APTF A Risk Management Program has been implemented at the Boeing/Rocketdyne Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL) Advanced Propulsion Test Facility (APTF) to reduce the risk of accidental releases of hazardous materials. This Risk Management Plan (RMP) summarizes the management, administrative, procedural, and technological controls that work together to minimize the risk to the community of hazardous hydrogen releases. As stated by Jim Albaugh, President of the Boeing Space and Communications Group, "Considering the criticality and complexity of our products and systems, quality and safety are core values for every one of us in the Space & Communications Group. Emphasis is shifting from detection to the prevention of problems and hazards through a systematic approach to quality and safety. This emphasis, starting with design and development, continues through procurement, manufacturing, and operational/customer support." This emphasis on safety is implemented by the Boeing/Rocketdyne Safety, Health, and Environmental Affairs (SHEA) organization, which develops and assembles EPA RMP and OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) plans in coordination with the facility involved. The facility manager implements the RMP and PSM programs, fulfilling the Boeing/Rocketdyne commitment to protect workers and the community. The SHEA emergency response policy involves the preparation of response plans, which are tailored to each facility and to the emergency response services available at SSFL and the surrounding community, and are in compliance with the EPA and OSHA Emergency Response Program requirements. APTF and Regulated Substances Handled APTF is owned and operated by Rocketdyne Propulsion & Power, a unit of the Boeing Company. The facility started operation in 1980. APTF is located in Area 1 of SSFL; it is manned continuously during working hours (one shift per day, Monday through Friday). SSFL occupies approxi mately 2,850 acres on a mountain plateau in Ventura County, at the top of Woolsey Canyon Road. It is located approximately 3 miles west of Chatsworth, 2.5 miles southeast of Simi Valley, 1 mile north of the gated community of Bell Canyon, and south of Sage Ranch, a Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy Park. With the exception of Bell Canyon, SSFL borders mainly undeveloped areas. SSFL features controlled access by guard station for 24 hours a day. One regulated substance, hydrogen, a flammable material, is handled at APTF in the maximum amount of 16,400 lb. The following units store this substance: Vessel Volume Physical Form.Density.Weight V-650 15,000 gal Liquid 0.59 lb/gal 8,850 lb V-093 1,000 gal Liquid 0.59 lb/gal 590 lb V-1349 600 ft3 at 5,000 psig Gas 1.48 lb/ft3 888 lb V-575 470 ft3 at 5,000 psig Gas 1.48 lb/ft3 696 lb TK-99 200,015 ft3 at 60 psig Gas 0.027 lb/ft3 5,400 lb The first two vessels are vacuum-jacketed vertical tanks, which store cryogenic hydrogen at a temperat ure of minus 4230F. The next two are horizontal pressure vessels, which store compressed hydrogen gas at ambient temperature. The last vessel (TK-99) is a sphere which stores hydrogen gas at relatively low pressure, located at Coca; this gas is compressed to 5,000 psig at Coca, then conveyed by a pipeline to APTF, located approximately 1 mile east of Coca. APTF tests rocket components using a highly instrumented system, which feeds liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen to the test article, where an ignition source initiates their combustion to form water (steam). Liquid hydrogen is transferred using compressed gaseous hydrogen. A computerized program controls test conditions, including stopping the test (the flow of chemicals) 2 seconds after levels fall outside preset ranges (an active mitigation measure). All personnel monitor tests from inside a reinforced control room (block house). The equipment is used intermittently, when tests (commonly lasting a few minutes) are performed. Worst Case Scenario An offsite consequence analysis was performed for a worst-case scenario, using procedures recommended by EPA in their "Risk Management Program Guidance for Offsite Consequence Analysis," April 1999 (OCA Guidance). This worst-case scenario involves, in compliance with EPA regulations [40 CFR 68.25(e)], vaporization of the greatest amount of hydrogen held in a single vessel, namely 8,850 lb (Tank V-650), resulting in a vapor cloud explosion. It should be noted that, due to the unconfined equipment arrangement at APTF, this occurrence can be considered highly unlikely. The distance to the EPA-specified endpoint (an overpressure of 1 psi) was determined using EPA-supplied equations (OCA Guidance, Equation C-1) based on TNT equivalency, with a 10% yield factor. At an overpressure of 1 psi, shattering of glass windows and failure of wood siding and corrugated steel or aluminum would be expected, with hazard to personnel limited to what may result from flying glass. The endpoin t reached was 1,214 ft (0.23 mile), a distance located entirely within the SSFL boundary. General Accidental Release Prevention Program and Chemical-Specific Prevention Steps A prevention program is in place to minimize the risk of hydrogen releases in accordance with the OSHA PSM rule. This program is based on the following key elements: 7 High level of training of the operators 7 Preventive maintenance program 7 Use of state-of-the-art process and safety equipment 7 Use of accurate and effective operating procedures, written with participation of the operators 7 Performance of a hazard review of equipment and procedures 7 Implementation of an auditing and inspection program. Chemical-specific prevention steps include availability of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), fire-resistant suits, face goggles and face shields, awareness of the hazardous properties of hydrogen, and presence of hydrogen detectors. Five-Year Accident History No accidental releases from hydrogen pr ocesses that resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant property damage onsite, or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental damage (40 CFR 68.42) have occurred at APTF in the past five years. Emergency Response Program Two emergency response plans are in place: the SSFL Master Emergency Plan and the APTF Emergency Response Plan. The latter includes alert systems, notification procedures, and an evacuation plan. The Boeing/Rocketdyne PSM/RMP coordinator is an active participant in the Local Emergency Response Planning Committee (LEPC, California Region 1). Emergency response drills and drill evaluations are conducted periodically. Emergency operation and response procedures are also reviewed at the start of a new test series. Planned Changes to Improve Safety A Process Hazard Analysis of the hydrogen system was performed, using the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) procedure, at the start of the last test series (August 1997). A ction items requiring replacements or modifications, review, or further investigation, were identified and addressed. These included technical items, such as installation of new mitigation or control equipment, and procedural/managerial items, such as improved maintenance or training. |