Seneca Foods Corp.- Proc. Facility, Rochester, MN - Executive Summary

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Seneca Foods Corp.- Process Facility, Rochester, MN 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
    The facility is a seasonal vegetable processor which cans and freezes a variety  of vegetables, including peas, corn, carrrots, and potatoes.  Peas are processed from mid-June to August, corn in August and September, and carrots and potatoes from early October to mid-November.  Shortly after processing, nearly all of the canned and frozen vegetables are shipped via truck to Seneca warehousing facilities located at 308 20th St. SE, Rochester, MN (approximately 8 blocks south of the processing facility). 
 
    An ammonia refigeration system is used at the processing facility - ammonia is a regulated substance per 40 CFR Part 68 Environmental Protection Agency (Appendix A).  The 12,400 lbs. of anhydrous ammonia in the system is used to provide refrigeration for the IQF (Individually Quick Frozen) tunnels,air units in the freezer tunnel room, and a vegetable cooling unit utilizing chilled water.  The threshhold report 
ing quantitiy for anhydrous ammonia is 10,000 lbs., thus Seneca's Process Facility  is required to comply with the EPA's Risk Management Plan (RMP) requirements. 
 
    Seneca's Process Facility has an accidental release prevention program in place which complies with OSHA's 29 CFR 1910.119 Process Safety Management Standard.  The International Institute of Ammonia Refigeration's (IIAR) "Guide to the Implementation of Process Safety Management (PSM) for Ammonia Refrigeration" was used to implement the PSM program at the Process Facility.  Parts of the program include: 
 
                        1)    Employee Participation 
                        2)    Process Safety Information 
                        3)    Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
                        4)    Operating Procedures 
                        5)    Training 
                        6)    Contractor Requirements 
                        7)    Pre Start-up Safety Review 
                        8)    Mechanical Integ 
rity Audits 
                        9)    Hot Work Permits 
                      10)   Management of Change 
                      11)   Incident Investigation 
                      12)   Emergency Planning and Response 
                      13)   Compliance Audits 
 
Gartner Refrigeration and Mfg. Inc. of Minneapolis, MN was (and continues to be) used to help implement the facility's PSM program,  including: system audits, PHA development, and employee training.  Gartner Regfrigeration also performs maintenance on the refrigeration system.  The refigeration system was installed in 1986, all componets were new when installed - no second hand equipment was used.  The system remains in excellent condition as a result of the dilgent maintenance program used by Seneca and Gartner.  
 
     The Rochester Fire Department is the Seneca Process Facility's designated outside first response team. 
 
     If an uncontrolled release develops, the following procedure will be used: 
 
 
        1) Freezer mechanic confirms leak 
                        2) Freezer mechanic evacuates the immediate area 
                        3) Management determines the need for a plant wide evacuation 
                        4) An upwind location is selected and the evacuation signal is ordered by   
                             the management staff(High-Low Siren) 
                        5) Time cards are collected for role call 
                        6) Rochester Fire Department* is notified by calling 911 
                        7) Roll call is taken at the assembly area and first aid is administered 
                        8) A list of employees not accounted for at roll call will be forwarded to 
                             the Rochester Fire Department 
                        9) Notification of appropriate Company Officials and Governmental Agencies                        
                             is done 
* = Rochester Fire Department will notify potentially affect 
ed offsite parties. 
 
 
Worst Case Scenario: 
 
    The Seneca Processing Facility has 12,400 lbs of anhydrous ammonia on site.  The "High Temperature Recirculator"  (HTR) located inside of the Engine Room is a vessel which is large enough to store the entire 12,400 lb. charge of ammonia.  It is possible that a large quantity of liquid ammonia could be stored in the vessel while performing maintenance on another part of the system.  It is also possible, but extremely improbable (- due to a regulating valve, level controls, and safeties) that all 12,400 lb. could migrate to the HTR during production.  The Off-Site Consequence Analysis - Worst Case Scenario for the Seneca Processing Facility is based on a rupture to the HTR while it contains 12,400 lb. of ammonia.  Rupturing of a vessel can result from impact with a lift truck, thermal shock, or tank fatigue.  The rupture of the HTR would have an offsite impact. 
 
    The Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) which was performed for the system in 1 
996 listed a rupture to 
the HTR as : 
 
                          a.) Likelihood = "Very Low" 
                                             and 
                          b.) Frequency of Occurrence = "Has occured in industry" 
 
    The PHA stated the following reasons that a rupture to the HTR would be unlikely: 
 
                        1) All vessels are designed according to appropriate ASME standards 
                        2) The vessel is elevated to minimize potential from fork lift traffic 
                        3) The lines are equipped with Pressure Relief Valves (PRV's), set to 250 psi to            
                             relieve pressure and minimize over pressurization of the system 
                        4) The HTR is equipped with PRV's set to relieve at 150 psi 
                        5) The lines are equipped with a by-pass line to minimize the potential for over 
                             pressurization of the line and the HTR 
 
6) By design the HTR is normally maintained at a pressure of 20 psi 
 
    The Offsite Consequences Analysis - Worst Case Scenario formula found in the "EPA GUIDE to RISK MANAGEMENT for AMMONIA REFRIGERATION" was used to determine the potential toxic endpoint distance of the ruptured HTR vessel.  The "Passive Mitigation" formula was used since the HTR is located inside of a building.  Factors for the formula included:  
 
                                                    Quantity of Ammonia = 12,400 lbs. 
                                                         Engine Room Size = 55,183 cu.ft. 
                                           Ventilation of Engine Room = 56,000 CFM 
 
The result of the formula showed a potential toxic endpoint distance in an urban setting of .8 miles from the Seneca Process Facility Engine Room. 
 
 
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO: 
 
    The Seneca Processing Facility has 12,400 lbs. of anhydrous ammonia on site.  The " Low Temperature Recirculator" (LTR) located inside o 
f the Tunnel Room is a vessel which is large enough to store the entire 12,400 lb. charge of ammonia.  It is possible that a large quantity of liquid ammonia could be stored in the vessel while performing maintenance on another part of the system.  It is also possible, but extremely improbable(-due to safeties, level controls, and a regulating valve) that all 12,400 lb. could migrate to the LTR during production.  The Off-site Consequence Analysis-Alternative Scenario for the Seneca Processing Facility is based on a rupture to the LTR while it contains 12,400 lbs. of ammonia.   
 
    Rupturing  of a vessel can result from impact with a lift truck, thermal shock, or tank fatigue.  Although the LTR is protected from lift trucks by posts anchored into the concrete floor, this scenario was chosen because the vessel is located in a fork lift area.  The rupture of the LTR would have an off-site impact. 
 
    The Process Hazard Analysis(PHA) which was performed for the system in 1996 listed a 
rupture to the LTR as: 
 
                                           a.) Likelihood = "Very Low" 
                                                             and 
                                           b.) Frequency of Occurence = "Has occured in industry" 
 
The PHA stated the following reasons that a rupture to the LTR would be unlikely: 
 
                        1) All vessels are desiged according to appropriate ASME standards 
                        2) The vessel is elevated to minimize potential impact from lift trucks to minimize  
                             vehicle impact 
                        3) The LTR is equipped with Pressure Relief Valves(PRV's) set to relieve at 150 psi 
                        4) All PRV's throughout the facilities are on a five year, documented, maintenance program. 
                        5) The lines are equipped with a by-pass line to minimize the potential  
                             for over pressurization of the lines and the LTR    
 
                       6)  By design the LTR is normally maintained at a pressure of 12" Hg vacuum 
 
    The Offsite Consequences Analysis - Alternative Scenario formula found in the "EPA GUIDE to RISK MANAGEMENT for AMMONIA REFRIGERATION" was used to determine the potential toxic endpoint distance of the ruptured LTR vessel.  The "Passive Mitigation" formula was used since the LTR is located inside of a building.  Factors for the formula included: 
 
                                                   Quantity of Ammonia =  12,400 lbs 
                                                        Tunnel Room Size =  176,929 cu.ft. 
                                          Ventilation of Tunnel Room =  64,000 CFM 
 
The result of the formula showed a potential toxic endpoint distance in a Urban setting of .2 miles from the Seneca Process Facility's Tunnel Room. 
 
 
TRAINING: 
 
    Gartner Refrigeration presents 16 hours of Ammonia Refrigeration Training every three years for maintenance and su 
pervisory personnel.  The process facility uses the "IIAR Ammonia Refrigeration Education & Training Program:  Series I - Basic Ammonia Refrigeration " as an inhouse training program for maintenance and supervisory personnel.  The IIAR video "Ammonia - Refrigerant of the Future " is also used as a training tool.  A Training Session will be conducted with the Rochester Fire Department annually. 
 
 
OTHER: 
 
New ammonia detectors will be installed during 1999 in the Engine Room and Tunnel Room,  replacing the outdated ammonia detectors installed in 1986.
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