Southeast Water Pollution Control Plant - Executive Summary

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Executive Summary 
Introduction  
Chemicals are widely used in industry and in the home, as well as present in the environment.  They are transported on roads, waterways, and railways.  We at the Southeast Water Pollution Control Plant (Southeast WPCP) use chemicals too.  For example, we use chlorine to disinfect our treated wastewater to provide safe discharge to the Delaware River. Storing large quantities of chlorine can be a hazard.  We take our safety obligations in storing and using chlorine as seriously as we do providing the effective, safe treatment of wastewater.  The following document describes what could happen if there were to be an accident, the steps we take everyday to ensure a safely operating plant, and what to do in event of an emergency.   
Accidental Release Prevention and  Emergency Response Policies 
The Philadelphia Water Department (PWD) and Southeast WPCP accidental release prevention policy involves a unified approach that integrates proven technology, trains s 
taff on operation and maintenance practices, and uses tested management system practices.  All applicable procedures of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Prevention Program are adhered to, including key elements such as training, systems management, and emergency response procedures.   
This document complies with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Risk Management Program, under Section 112 (r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments of 1990, 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 68. The Southeast WPCP has a chlorination system that uses chlorine gas fed from rail cars. This document summarizes our existing health and safety programs, our internal management response team, policies, procedures, and on-going actions that are designed to prevent or minimize impacts of accidental releases of chlorine to the environment. The Southeast WPCP has prepared a detailed and comprehensive emergency response plan to handle any potential accidental releases that is desi 
gned to safeguard both on- and off-site people. To date, we have had an excellent record in preventing accidents from occurring. 
General Facility and Regulated Substances Information 
The Southeast WPCP, operating since 1954, is located at 25 Pattison Avenue in the City of Philadelphia. The plant is located on property between Interstate 95 and the Walt Whitman Bridge in South Philadelphia.  Wastewater treated at the Southeast WPCP is disinfected with chlorine and discharged to the Delaware River.  The treated wastewater meets all EPA standards. This wastewater treatment includes preliminary screening, primary settlement and treatment, secondary sedimentation and treatment, and chlorination before final discharge.  The Southeast WPCP discharges up to 168 million gallons per day (MGD) of treated wastewater, with an average flow of 112 MGD. 
The facility currently stores chlorine, which is a regulated toxic substance under 40 CFR Part 68 - RMP.  The Plant's chlorine storage exceeds the lis 
ted threshold quantity of 2,500 pounds in the RMP Regulations. 
Liquid chlorine is brought to the plant via rail lines that enter the plant property. Chlorine leak detector monitors continuously check for leaks in the bulk storage areas and in the chlorination rooms. Other indicators include chlorine feed and evaporator alarms. These alarms are annunciated at the central and local control panels at the plant in the main control room. In the case of a leak, the storage area has an audible alarm and red flashing warning light on top of the building.  In addition, an evaporator shut-off and pressure reducing valve is designed to close if low evaporator gas temperature is detected; thus preventing liquid chlorine from reaching the gas piping system.  These valves also reduce pressure and allow for quicker liquefaction to occur.  All process related, factory-set pressure relief valves are set to protect the integrity of the equipment. 
The rail car storage area is covered for sun protection a 
nd the chlorination room is enclosed in the effluent pumping station building.  The chlorination room is equipped with an automatic ventilation system that activates when the chlorine leak detector detects 5 ppm of chlorine in the room.  Emergency showers and eye wash stations are provided at each building.  The rail car storage area and the effluent pumping station both have Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBAs) available.    
The Southeast WPCP is controlled at Pattison Avenue by a gate that is only open during normal working hours.  Visitors and contractors must check-in at the administration building and be approved by Southeast WPCP staff prior to entry into the facility.  The plant is manned 24-hours a day, year round, and alarms notify staff of any problems or situations that require follow-up investigations at all times.       
Offsite Consequence Analysis Results 
The offsite consequence analysis includes consideration of two release scenarios, identified as "worst case" and 
"alternative" release scenarios. The worst case scenario assumes that the entire content of the largest single container of chlorine is released, regardless of how improbable that may be.  In addition, only "passive" mitigation methods, such as buildings or dikes (for liquids) can be considered.  Passive mitigation, as defined, requires no mechanical, electrical, or human input. The regulations require that the worst case scenario assume atmospheric conditions that are conservative and result in large impact areas. 
An alternative release scenario is also required.   
The worst case release scenario for chlorine is focused on the 90-ton rail cars that store chlorine liquid. The scenario used for Southeast WPCP is the rupture of one chlorine rail car with a maximum capacity of 90 tons, resulting in a release of 180,000 pounds of chlorine over a 10-minute duration. The chlorine rail cars are stored in an area that is not totally enclosed, so no building mitigation factor can be applied a 
t Southeast WPCP. The release rate for this scenario is 18,000  pounds per minute (lbs/min).     
The rail car rupture resulting in a chlorine release could be caused by catastrophic events, such as an earthquake. In practice this type of total release of a rail car would be unlikely and never occur during the lifetime of the plant. The results of the dispersion modeling analysis for this worst case release scenario indicate that this scenario has an offsite impact. 
The alternative release reflects a type of release that is more likely to occur, as compared to the worst case scenario.  Unlike the worst case scenario, the alternative release scenario may consider "active" mitigation, such as automatic shutoff valves and scrubbers.  Active mitigation is defined as requiring mechanical, electrical, or human input.  Lastly, the alternative release scenario assumes more realistic regional and seasonal meteorology. 
Based on the process hazard analysis performed for the chlorine system, severa 
l alternative release scenarios were selected.  Unlike the worst case release scenario, active controls can be applied to minimize the leak or impacts.  Active controls consist of mechanical, electrical, or human input.  The scenario used for chlorine was a failure of the excess flow valve on the chlorine rail car with no mitigation. Under this scenario, the amount of chlorine released was calculated to be 126.0 lbs/min. The results of the dispersion modeling analysis for the worst alternative release scenario indicate that this scenario has a slight offsite impact.  
Five-year Accident History Summary 
No chlorine releases that could have caused safety or health hazards to any individuals at on-site or off-site locations (no deaths, injuries, property or environmental damage, evacuations, or sheltering in place) occurred at Southeast WPCP during the last five years.  
Summary of the Accidental Release Prevention Program and Chemical-specific Prevention Steps  
Southeast WPCP is in complia 
nce with Federal Risk Management Planning (RMP) requirements.  Chemical-specific prevention steps include availability of self-contained escape breathing apparatus, worn by the operators during connection and disconnection of the chlorine supply, awareness of the hazardous and toxic properties of chlorine, and the presence of chlorine detectors and alarms. 
Southeast WPCP's accidental release prevention program is based on the following key elements: 
* Detailed management system and clear levels of responsibilities and team member roles 
* Comprehensive safety process information that is readily available to staff, emergency responders,  and contractors 
* Comprehensive preventive maintenance program 
* Completion of a process hazard analysis of equipment and procedures with operation and maintenance staff participation and review. 
* Use of state-of-the-art process and safety equipment 
* Use of accurate and effective operating procedures, written with operations and maintenance staff parti 
cipation 
* High level of training of operators and maintenance staff 
* Implementation of an incident investigation, inspection, and auditing program using qualified staff. 
 
Safety Information 
Comprehensive chemical data have been assembled to include regulatory reporting and action thresholds, health hazard, and chemical exposure limitations, as well as detailed physical properties of each regulated substance.  This information was compiled from numerous sources and is intended to be a one-stop source for the reader seeking data about these substances.  This information includes chlorine background information, material safety data sheets (MSDS), and chlorine reaction chemistry. 
Equipment safety information was meticulously compiled on the chlorine process.  Specifications for the process are collected in one place for easy reference.  Details such as maximum intended inventory; safe upper and lower temperatures; safe upper and lower pressures; and codes and standards used to design, b 
uild, and operate the processes are on file at the facility. 
We also have procedures in place that is triggered to update safety information if there is a major change that makes existing information inaccurate. 
Hazard Analysis  
In 1998, a detailed hazard analysis (HA) was conducted with plant staff, engineering, and administrative staff for the regulated process.  The team consisted of process operating and maintenance experts and process design engineers.  The HA technique used was the "What-If" scenario and process checklist procedure, per acceptable approach guidance from EPA. The HA was lead by knowledgeable persons on the type of process being reviewed.  This review will be updated again within a five-year period, or whenever there is major change in the process.  A list of actions to resolve any found significant hazard review findings was prepared, and staff is currently working to resolve this action item list.  Staff will document completion of any action item. 
Operating Proc 
edures 
Southeast WPCP maintains up-to-date, accurate, written operating procedures that give clear instructions for the chlorine process. Southeast WPCP ensures effective operating practices by combining them with operating and maintenance training programs.  Standard operating procedures (SOPs) provide system descriptions, specifications, equipment inspection requirements, and operating procedures for the chlorine system.  Procedures include startup, shutdown, and normal, alternate, and emergency operation.  Also included are maintenance and troubleshooting procedures, including consequences of deviation and the steps to avoid and correct deviations.  Southeast WPCP will update procedures whenever a change occurs that alters the steps needed to operate safely.  Operating procedures will be developed and in place prior to any new process equipment coming on line or a changed process starting back up. 
Operations and  Maintenance Training Program 
Each Southeast WPCP employee presently in 
volved in operating or maintaining the chlorine process is trained in an overview of the process and detailed, applicable operating and maintenance procedures.  In fact, Southeast WPCP helps their employees understand, through training, the nature and cause of problems arising from operations involving chlorine on site, and to increase their employees awareness with respect to their hazards. Southeast WPCP's training program includes both initial and refresher training that covers 1) a general overview of the processes, 2) the properties and hazards of the substances in the process, and 3) a detailed review of the process operating procedures and safe work practices.  Oral reviews and written self-evaluations are used to verify that an employee understands the training material before the process work can be resumed.  
Training documentation includes: date of most recent review or revision to the training program, type of training required, and the type of competency testing used to ens 
ure staff understands the training.   
Maintenance Program 
Southeast WPCP maintains the mechanical integrity of process equipment to help prevent equipment failures that could endanger workers, the public, or the environment.  Southeast WPCP believes that this program is the primary line of defense against a release, and addresses equipment testing and inspection, preventative maintenance schedules, and personnel training. Southeast WPCP's maintenance program includes the following: 
* Written procedures for maintaining mechanical integrity through inspection and testing of process equipment, based on instructions of equipment vendors, industry codes, and prior operating experience 
* Implementation of the written procedures by performing inspections and tests on process equipment at specified intervals 
* Training of maintenance personnel in procedures for safe work practices, such as lockout/tagout, line or equipment opening, and avoidance and correction of unsafe conditions 
Internal Com 
pliance Audits 
Internal compliance audits are conducted every three years to verify compliance with the programs and procedures contained in the RMP.  Southeast WPCP and PWD assembles an audit team that includes personnel knowledgeable in the Risk Management Program rule and in the process, and this team evaluates whether the prevention program satisfies the requirements of the Risk Management Program rule and whether the prevention program is sufficient to help ensure safe operation of the process.  The results of the audit are documented, recommendations are resolved, and appropriate enhancements to the prevention program are implemented. 
Incident Investigation 
Southeast WPCP investigates all incidents that could reasonably have resulted in a serious injury to personnel, the public, or the environment so that similar accidents can be prevented.  Southeast WPCP trains employees to identify and report any incident that requires investigation.  An investigation team is assembled and the 
investigation is initiated within 48 hours of the incident.  The results of the investigation are documented, recommendations are resolved, and appropriate process enhancements are implemented.  Information found during the investigation is reviewed by affected staff, added or used to revise operating and maintenance procedures, and passed on to the training unit for their inclusion in existing training programs, if warranted, to prevent a future event. 
Emergency Response Program Summary 
Southeast WPCP has established a written emergency response program that is followed by the employees to help safely respond to accidental releases of hazardous substances.  This program has been coordinated with the City of Philadelphia Fire Department HAZMAT Unit, which is a member of the Local Emergency Response Planning Committee (LEPC).  This program includes an emergency response notification plan.  Emergency response drills and drill evaluations are conducted at a minimum frequency of every 12  
months; emergency operation and response procedures are also reviewed at that time. 
Planned Changes to Improve Safety 
A few minor changes to improve safety (recommended actions) were identified for the chlorine process in 1998 during the hazard review process.  These recommended actions have been evaluated and will be implemented as required.  It is expected that the recommended actions will be evaluated and implemented by December 1999.  The implementation of these recommendations will further improve the safety of the covered processes.  
SOUTHEAST WPCP     
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY    RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
 
 
 
 
SE_RMP_EXECSUMMARY.DOC    ES-6 
 
SE_RMP_EXECSUMMARY.DOC    ES-1
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