Muller-Pinehurst Dairy - Executive Summary |
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1.0 SOURCE AND PROCESS DESCRIPTION 1.1 SOURCE The Muller-Pinehurst Dairy is subject to the United Stated Environmental Protection Agency's (USEPA's) Risk Management Program (RMP) for Accidental Chemical Release regulation (40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] 68) because it has a refrigeration system that contains more than the threshold quantity (10,000 pounds) of anhydrous ammonia (ammonia) (Chemical Abstract System Number 7664-41-7). Anhydrous ammonia is a gas at ambient conditions. The anhydrous ammonia refrigeration system is used to control the processing and storage temperature for ice cream, milk, and related products. It is a closed system that contains approximately 13,800 pounds (i.e., 2,600 gallons) of ammonia in various physical states (gas, liquid, and saturated vapor). The largest vessel is the high pressure receiver that operates at approximately 150 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) and can contain as much as 2,840 pounds of liquid ammonia (at its ma ximum safe fill volume of 90 percent). However, during typical operation, the vessel holds only about 1,300 pounds. Most of the ammonia equipment is located indoors. The condensing towers, make-up air units, and some piping runs are located outdoors. Ammonia is the oldest and most common refrigerant in general industrial use throughout the world. It is a high capacity refrigerant that operates at reasonable pressure. Although exposure to ammonia is irritating and potentially toxic in large doses, personnel exposure to more than a small leak is rare because ammonia operates within a closed system of vessels, piping, and equipment. 1.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION The Muller-Pinehurst Dairy ammonia refrigeration system is a two-stage system. The high pressure receiver supplies high-pressure (135 to 190 psig) liquid ammonia to several units including: the 3-barrel ice cream freezer, lower cooler units, Mueller vat, ante room units, glycol chiller, small hardening room unit #2, hollywood cooler units, and McDonald's dock air unit. The receiver also feeds ammonia to the intercooler, which in turn feeds additional units including: storage area unit, large hardening room unit, small hardening room unit #1, new and old ice builders, and half-gallon air units 1 through 3. The Mueller vat, hardening rooms, storage area, and ante room units return liquid/vapor ammonia to one of three suction traps. The suction traps are designed to supply liquid free suction to the booster compressors. Booster compressors supply ammonia vapor at 25 psig to the intercooler. Ammonia vapor from the intercooler is fed to one of five high stage compressors (four reciprocating compressors and one screw compressor). The major discharge from the high-stage compressors (hot gas), at 135 to 190 psig, is vented to two condensing towers. The condensed liquid is returned to the high-pressure receiver. A recirculator receives a liquid/vapor ammonia stream from the hollywood cooler units, lower cooler units, and McDonald's dock air unit. Liquid ammonia is recirculated to these units via a pumper drum. High- pressure suction is directed to the booster compressor discharge header. The ammonia refrigeration system is protected by the existence of specific safety systems/hardware, including safety relief valves, engine room ventilation, and system safety interlocks. Safety relief valves protect the compressor discharge, condensers, pumper drums, suction accumulators, and the intercooler from the hazards associated with overpressure. Safety interlocks include high pressure and high temperature alarms and cutouts for the compressors, as well as high level floats and sensors for the system vessels. The high-pressure cutouts for the compressors are set at 200 psig. 2.0 POTENTIAL RELEASE SCENARIOS The refrigeration system is a totally closed system. Historically, releases of ammonia from industrial refrigeration systems most often occur from leak ing valves, malfunctioning pressure relief devices, or inadvertent releases during repair activities. While these incidents can impact employees, they seldom lead to a release of a reportable quantity or represent an off-site impact (i.e., beyond the property line). Consistent with the RMP rule requirements, two specifically defined release scenarios (a worst-case release and an alternative release) were analyzed to determine the maximum distance to an endpoint where the ammonia concentration is 200 parts per million in air, or 0.02 percent. This endpoint represents the maximum airborne concentration below which nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible effects or symptoms that could impair their ability to take protective action. The release scenarios analyzed are based upon the guidance contained in the USEPA's Risk Management Program Guidance for Ammonia Refrigeration (the "Model Plan"), dated November 19 98. This guidance document used the SACRUNCH atmospheric dispersion model to construct "lookup" tables that relate the quantity and rate of ammonia released to the endpoint distance. 2.1 WORST-CASE RELEASE The worst-case release is considered to be defined by the catastrophic rupture and complete loss of the maximum contents of the high pressure receiver (approximately 2,840 pounds of ammonia) over a 10-minute period. Using the specified worst-case meteorology contained in the Model Plan, the distance to the endpoint for a worst-case release was estimated to be 5,060 feet or 0.96 miles. Although the worst-case consequence analysis is required by the RMP, it should be considered a highly unlikely event. Design, construction, and operation of the high pressure receiver is such that catastrophic failure is extremely remote. The receiver was designed and constructed in strict accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel C ode (Section VIII), and was certified and stamped by the National Board of Pressure Vessel Inspectors (National Board). Third party and state mandated inspections of the vessel's condition occurs annually by a boiler and machinery insurance inspector who has been certified by the National Board. In addition, the vessel is inspected daily by a plant facility mechanic, trained in the operation of the system. There are only two plausible causes for a catastrophic loss of containment of the high pressure receiver: (1) the internal pressure were to increase uncontrollably and rupture the vessel from the inside or (2) rupture of the vessel wall due to inadvertent contact and damage from the outside. The vessel is operated well below the design pressure (i.e., maximum allowable working pressure) of 250 psig and because of the safety factors built into the ASME Code, a fourfold pressure excursion, to approximately 1,000 psig, would have to occur before catastrophic vessel fail ure. Such pressures could not be generated internally. The only logical external cause of high pressure would be flame impingement or surface radiation from a high challenge fire adjacent to the vessel. If this were to occur, the vessel is equipped with a safety relief valve (SRV) set to relieve internal pressure at 250 psig. A high pressure excursion would not occur as long as the SRV continued to function. Actuation of the SRV would result in an ammonia release similar to that described in Section 2.2 for the alternative- release scenario. The SRVs are on a five-year replacement schedule, in compliance with the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (IIAR) guidance contained in IIAR Bulletin Number 109, Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safety Ammonia Refrigeration System, to ensure that they will function properly when required. Further, rupture of the vessel from the outside as a result of inadvertent contact (e.g., vehicular) is unlikely since the unit is provided with substantial barrier protection to preclude this occurrence. In addition, the worst-case release scenario is unlikely for the following additional reasons: ? The worst-case weather conditions which were used for this scenario are uncommon; ? Only rarely, if ever, are the contents of the system intentionally pumped back to the receiver. Typically, the receiver contains only 1,300 pounds; ? Industry standards were followed for the manufacture and quality control of these receivers; ? Ammonia is not corrosive in this service and the vessels are relatively new; ? Safety relief valves limit operating pressures in the receiver; ? The facility has a preventive maintenance program in place to maintain the ongoing integrity of the vessels; ? The facility has a training program designed to ensure that the system is operated by qualified personnel; ? The facility has emergency response procedures which enable trained personnel to respond quickly to isolate a ny potential releases; ? Main ammonia shut-off valves exist, and are prominently labeled, to allow personnel to stop the flow of ammonia quickly in an emergency; ? Inadvertent vehicular contact with the vessel is unlikely since the unit is located indoors and provided with substantial barrier protection to preclude this occurrence. 2.2 ALTERNATIVE-CASE RELEASE The alternative, or "more likely," scenario is considered to be defined by a release of ammonia through a 1/4-inch effective diameter hole in a high side (i.e., 150 psig) pipe or vessel, releasing 100 pounds of ammonia per minute for up to 60 minutes. This release is representative of a small pipe or vessel leak. It would also be representative of a flange leak or pump seal failure. Because some piping is located outdoors, passive (building) mitigation was not used to reduce the release rate or the distance to the endpoint. Active mitigation was considered, because it is believed that emergency responders cou ld identify and stop the leak in less than 60 minutes. However, the application of active mitigation does not change the TEP distance obtained from the Model Plan. Using the specified meteorology contained in the Model Plan, the distance to the endpoint for the "more likely" release scenario was estimated to be 1,020 feet or 0.2 miles. The alternative release scenario is unlikely for the following reasons: ? Many of the high pressure liquid lines are located in enclosed areas that could help to contain such a release, and the outside piping is elevated to promote dispersion; ? Industrial standards were followed for the manufacture and quality control of these lines; ? Ammonia is not corrosive in this service; ? Most of the lines are elevated or in service tunnels to minimize potential damage from fork lifts; ? The receiver is fitted with a manually operated valve (i.e., King valve) which can be closed to reduce the flow of liquid in an emergency; ? The facility has a preventive maintenance program in place to maintain the ongoing integrity of the system; ? The facility has a training program designed to ensure that the system is operated by qualified personnel; and ? The facility has emergency response procedures which enable trained personnel to respond quickly to isolate any potential releases by closing valves in the liquid lines. 3.0 PREVENTION PROGRAM The facility has carefully considered the potential for accidental releases of ammonia, such as the occurrence of the worst-case and alternative-release scenarios described in Section 2.0. To help minimize the probability and severity of an ammonia release, a prevention program that satisfies the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals standard (29 CFR 1910.119) has been implemented. The key components of the prevention program are summarized below: ? The development, documentation, and operator availability of c ritical process safety information regarding the hazards of ammonia, the design basis of the system, and the equipment. This information is used to fully understand and safely operate the ammonia refrigeration system. ? The development of an employee participation program, which includes employees from all levels of the organization and from all areas within the plant (i.e., production and maintenance). This program also assumes that employees that utilize the ammonia system and are most knowledgeable about it are best able to easily, effectively, and regularly recommend changes or improvements which enhance safety. ? The performance of a formal process hazard analysis (PHA) in 1998, using the "What if/checklist" technique. A team with expertise in engineering, operations, maintenance, and safety evaluated the existing refrigeration system in depth and developed recommendations to improve the safety and operability of the system. The PHA addressed: (1) process ha zards, (2) previous incidents, (3) engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards, (4) the consequence of control failure, (5) facility siting, (6) human factors, and (7) a qualitative evaluation of possible safety and health effects of control system failures. The PHA will be updated and revalidated every five years. ? Written operating procedures (OPs) were prepared in 1997 and 1998 to provide the basis for proper and safe operation of the ammonia refrigeration system. The OPs include procedures for normal operation, startup, shutdown, emergency operation, and emergency shutdown. They also describe safe operating limits for temperature and pressure, the consequences of operating outside these safe operating limits, and a description of safety systems and how they operate. ? Refrigeration system operators receive refresher training at least every 3 years. The training content is based upon the process safety information and operating procedures . The training program ensures that the operators understand the nature and causes of problems arising from system operations and serves to increase awareness with respect to the hazards particular to ammonia and the refrigeration process. ? Formal authorization systems (i.e., management of change procedure, pre-startup safety review) are in place to ensure that system changes or expansions are as safe as the original design and that an independent recheck, prior to start-up, confirms that the changes are consistent with the engineering design and safety requirements. ? Events that might (or did) cause an accidental or unexpected release of ammonia are subjected to a formal investigation. The objective of the investigation is to correct deficiencies in such a way as to prevent recurrence. ? Contractors that are hired to work on, or adjacent to, the refrigeration system are "pre-qualified" based upon their knowledge of ammonia refrigeration, understanding of appli cable codes and standards, and their demonstrated ability to work safely. ? Prior to the performance of any hot work (i.e., spark or flame producing operations such as welding, cutting, brazing, and grinding), management must approve the work by executing a written hot work authorization permit to verify that appropriate precautions to prevent fire have been implemented. ? Periodic walk-throughs occur to find unusual or increasing vibration, incipient leaks, or other indications of potential upsets or failures that could lead to a release. ? Replacement of all pressure relief valves in 1999 and every 5 years thereafter. ? Numerous safety systems including pressure relief valves and ammonia vessel level controls and safety interlocks are used in the refrigeration system. ? Periodic inspections are performed for major powered equipment, including compressors, large fans, bearings, couplings, shaft seals, and mountings, etc., for vibration or incipient mechanical f ailure. ? Proper design including adherence to recognized safety codes. ? Adherence to fire codes and preparation for fires, storms, or events which could impact the ammonia system. ? Planning with the local fire department to ensure a rapid response to potential incidents involving the system or external events, such as storms or tornadoes. ? Prevention program compliance audits performed every 3 years to verify that the elements are being properly implemented. Any deficiency found in an audit is corrected. 4.0 ACCIDENT HISTORY There have been no accidental releases of ammonia at the facility in the last 5 years (since June 1994) that have resulted in on-site death, injury, or significant property damage or off-site death, injury, evacuation, sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental damage. 5.0 EMERGENCY ACTION PROGRAM The facility has implemented a detailed written Emergency Action Plan (EAP). The EAP is intended to address all emergencies at the fa cility in addition to incidents related to a minor release of ammonia. The EAP includes awareness and response training for employees, coordination with the local fire department, and evacuation of the facility. The plan details what personal protective equipment and spill response equipment is available; identifies specific individuals, their 24-hour telephone numbers, and their responsibilities; identifies procedures for emergency medical care; and refers to other pertinent elements of the management system (i.e., standard operating procedures). Passive mitigation means equipment, devices, and technologies that function without human, mechanical, or other energy input. Examples include enclosures (e.g., buildings) for compressed gases and secondary containment dikes for liquids. Active mitigation means equipment, devices, or technologies that require human, mechanical, or other energy input to function. Active mitigation for compressed gases, like ammonia, may incl ude automatic shut-off valves, rapid transfer systems, and scrubbers. ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 1 RMP FOR ANHYDROUS AMMONIA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND DATA ELEMENTS MULLER-PINEHURST DAIRY, ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS f:\cpf\pf\98292nc\06\wp\rpts\exec-sum\text.doc |