E&J Gallo Winery - Fresno - Executive Summary

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 
The E&J Gallo Fresno Winery is located at  5610 East Olive Avenue in Fresno, California.  The facility crushes grapes in order to produce wine, distilled spirits, and juice for concentrate.  These products are stored prior to shipment to other Gallo facilities for further processing and distribution. 
 
The facility operates anhydrous ammonia refrigeration to provide product cooling.  Refrigeration systems have storage vessels (receivers) sized to contain all the liquid ammonia in the system, with additional capacity for thermal expansion.  
 
The ammonia refrigeration system is a closed loop heat transfer system.  Ammonia moves through the system due to pressure differences produced by the compressors.  A brief description of the ammonia refrigeration cycle follows: 
 
1.  The receiver vessel stores liquid ammonia under pressure.  High pressure liquid ammonia flows from the receiver through liquid lines to the expansion valve, which partitions the pr 
essure and temperature.  Liquid ammonia at reduced pressure and temperature is then piped into the chiller shell.   
 
2. Product is circulated through sealed stainless steel tubing within the chiller shell.  Heat from the warm product transfers through the tubing walls to the cooler refrigerant, causing liquid refrigerant to boil off as low pressure vapor.  The rate of vaporization, and thereby the cooling of product, is determined by the amount of pressure in the chiller as controlled by a back pressure regulator, and suction from the compressors. 
 
3. The compressors draw the low pressure vapor from the chiller, compress it into high pressure vapor, and discharge to the evaporative condenser (cooling tower). 
 
4. In the evaporative condenser, ammonia vapor flows through tubing which is sprayed with water and located within fan driven air flow to promote cooling.  The ammonia vapor transfers heat through the tubing walls to the cooling water.  The ammonia condenses back to a liquid wh 
ich drains by gravity to the receiver vessel. 
 
In addition to ammonia refrigeration systems, the facility uses anhydrous ammonia to adjust the pH of process water. 
 
The Winery maintains storage vessels of liquid sulfur dioxide used as a stabilizing agent during processing activities.  
Ammonia Systems (Processes) - Federal RMP Program Level 3: 
 
Refrigeration System # 1 
capacity 2829 gal x 80% = 2263 gal = 11,655 lbs. 
 
Refrigeration System # 2 
   capacity 2851 gal x 80% = 2281 gal = 11,745 lbs. 
 
Refrigeration System # 3 
capacity 3000 gal x 80% = 2400 gal = 12,360 lbs. 
    
Refrigeration System # 6 
   capacity 3000 gal x 80% = 2400 gal = 12,360 lbs. 
 
Refrigeration System # 8-9-10-11 
   capacity 4808 gal x 80% = 3846 gal = 19,808 lbs. 
 
Refrigeration System # 13-16 
   capacity 5839 gal x 80% = 4,671 gal = 24,057 lbs. 
 
Refrigeration System # 14-15 
   capacity 6020 gal x 80% = 4,816 gal = 24,802 lbs. 
 
Refrigeration System # 17-18 
   capacity 6033 gal x 80% =  4,826 gal = 24,856 lbs. 
 
Ammonia Supply Tank at 
Main Wastewater Sump 
   capacity 10,060 gal x 80% = 8,048 gal = 45,758 lbs. 
 
Sulfur Dioxide Supply System- Two Processes - Federal Program Level 3: 
Two Sulfur Dioxide Storage Vessels  
   Tank 1 capacity 5000 gal x 80% = 4000 gal = 48,696 lbs. 
   Tank 2 capacity 5000 gal x 80% = 4000 gal = 48,696 lbs. 
 
Sulfur dioxide storage vessel by main sump  
 Used to fill 25 pound and 100 pound dispensers 
   Tank capacity 1500 gal x 80% = 1200 gal = 14,400 lbs. 
 
FIVE YEAR ACCIDENT HISTORY 
Sulfur Dioxide  
In the five year period prior to this submission, the E&J Gallo Winery has experienced no sulfur dioxide accidents resulting in injury to employees or injury or evacuation of the public. 
 
Ammonia  
In the five year period prior to this submission, the E&J Gallo Winery has experienced one incident involving a Cal ARP (RMP) covered ammonia process.  The incident caused no injury or evacuation of employees or the public, however employees in a nearby office building were advised to remain indoors during the  
incident. 
 
TOXIC WORST CASE RELEASE SCENARIO: 
The worst case release scenario was determined in accordance with requirements of the California Accidental Release Prevention Program. 
This requires modeling the offsite consequences of a total catastrophic failure of the largest storage vessel, with all product within the vessel dispersing into the air within ten minutes.  For the Fresno facility, the  
worst case scenario involves the sulfur dioxide storage tank.  Under pessimistic weather conditions (stability F, wind speed 1.5 meters per second) sulfur dioxide was predicted to reach the toxic endpoint of 3 parts per million in air at a distance 6.5 miles from the source.   
 
TOXIC ALTERNATIVE RELEASE SCENARIOS:  Air Permitting Specialists was retained to provide modeling of alternative release scenarios. 
 
Sulfur Dioxide - A more credible release scenario would involve damage to piping due to contact from motorized equipment operating in the area.  If damage was sufficient to cause a fail 
ure, it could result in a 1 square inch opening.  The release of sulfur dioxide from the opening could be expelled into the air and onto surrounding surfaces.  Under more typical weather conditions (stability D, wind speed 4.5 meters per second)  the predicted distance to the 3 ppm toxic endpoint would be 2.5 miles from the source.  
 
Ammonia - A more credible release scenario would involve damage to liquid ammonia piping at a chiller due to contact from motorized equipment operating in the area.  If damage was sufficient to cause a failure, it could occur at a flange due to bolt failure, and result in a 1 square inch opening.  The release of liquid ammonia from the opening could be expelled into the air and onto surrounding surfaces.  Under more typical weather conditions (stability D, wind speed 4.5 meters per second)  the predicted distance to the 200 ppm toxic endpoint would be 0.5mile from the source.    
 
ACCIDENTAL RELEASE PREVENTION  
The E&J Gallo Winery employs refrigeration m 
echanics, supported by engineering staff .  The refrigeration system is maintained through the implementation of a scheduled preventive maintenance program based upon standard industry practices, and many years of practical experience.    
Employees required to operate ammonia refrigeration equipment receive training specific to their assigned duties.  Sulfur dioxide systems are maintained by personnel from the maintenance and instrumentation departments.  
 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
In the event of a reportable chemical release, notifications will be made to the appropriate agencies including the Fresno County Health Services Agency, the State Office of Emergency Services, and the Federal National Response Center.   
 
Gallo management and members of the in-house emergency response team would respond to the site, and work with public emergency response personnel in mitigating the problem. 
 
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 
The Management of Change procedure will require evaluation of new construction and mod 
ifications to existing ammonia systems to determine the likelihood of an effect on ammonia safety.  Changes expected to have a significant safety effect on quantity, systems, or procedures will be referred to the appropriate Risk Management Program team for further study.   
 
COMPLIANCE AUDITS 
E&J Gallo Winery will perform an annual Risk Management Program compliance audit.  The specific items in the Risk Management Plan will be re-examined, and compliance documented.  The team reviewing these systems will consist of personnel from Engineering, Instrumentation, Maintenance, and Operations. 
 
PLANNED CHANGES TO IMPROVE SAFETY 
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPS) of the ammonia and sulfur dioxide systems were performed during 1996 and 1997 .  The study teams were composed of engineering, maintenance, and management personnel from E&J Gallo Winery.  As a result of the study, numerous improvements were made to existing systems.   These improvements included the installation of additional  
protective barriers, upgrades to system controls, and improved chemical handling systems.  These improvements were completed prior to submission of this Risk Management Program document.
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