Boeing/Rocketdyne SSFL - Executive Summary |
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1.1 Accidental Release Prevention and Emergency Response Policies at SSFL A Risk Management Program has been implemented at the Boeing/Rocketdyne Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL) to reduce the risk of accidental releases of hazardous materials. This Risk Management Plan (RMP) summarizes the management, administrative, procedural, and technological controls that work together to minimize the risk to the community of hazardous hydrogen releases. As stated by Jim Albaugh, President of the Boeing Space and Communications Group, "Considering the criticality and complexity of our products and systems, quality and safety are core values for every one of us in the Space & Communications Group. Emphasis is shifting from detection to the prevention of problems and hazards through a systematic approach to quality and safety. This emphasis, starting with design and development, continues through procurement, manufacturing, and operational/customer support." This emphasis on safety is implemen ted by the Boeing/Rocketdyne Safety, Health, and Environmental Affairs (SHEA) organization, which develops and assembles US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)/CalARP RMPs and OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) plans, in coordination with the facility involved. The facility manager implements the RMP and PSM programs, fulfilling the Boeing/Rocketdyne commitment to protect workers and the community. The SHEA emergency response policy involves the preparation of response plans, which are tailored to each facility and to the emergency response services available at SSFL and the surrounding community, and are in compliance with the USEPA/CalARP and OSHA Emergency Response Program requirements. 1.2 SSFL and Regulated Substances Handled SSFL occupies approximately 2,850 acres on a mountain plateau in Ventura County, at the top of Woolsey Canyon Road. It is located approximately 3 miles west of Chatsworth, 2.5 miles southeast of Simi Valley, 1 mile north of the gated community of Bell Canyon, and south of Sage Ranch, a Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy Park. With the exception of Bell Canyon, SSFL borders mainly undeveloped areas. SSFL is manned continuously during working hours (one shift per day, Monday through Friday); SSFL features controlled access by guard station for 24 hours a day. SSFL is divided into four areas (I - IV) and a Buffer Zone. The latter occupies the approximate southern half of the site. Rocketdyne Propulsion and Power, a unit of the Boeing Company, operates SSFL. NASA owns Area II and a small part of Area I. Part of Area IV is Department of Energy (DOE)-optioned land. All other areas are owned by the Boeing Company. One Federally-regulated substance, hydrogen, is handled at SSFL. Other substances, regulated by the State of California, are handled at SSFL in specific facilities. These substances are addressed in separate RMPs. Hydrogen, a flammable material, is handled at SSFL at Coca (three locations) and at the Advanced Propulsion Test Facility (APTF). A hydrogen sphere ("Black Ball", V-099), located at Coca, stores approximately 200,000 ft3 of gaseous hydrogen. This sphere is connected by piping to two other Coca locations (Coca V-100 and Coca-4) and two additional SSFL facilities, APTF, and the System Testing Laboratory IV (STL-IV). Vessel V-099 is located approximately one mile west of APTF and 0.9 mile east-south-east of STL-IV. APTF is located in Area I, Coca in AreaII, and STL-IV in Area III. STL-IV does not handle hydrogen at present. The other connected facilities have additional hydrogen storage on site, as listed below. The total maximum amount stored is 318,635 lb. Facility,Vessel Volume Physical Form Density Weight APTF, V-650 15,000 gal Liquid 0.59 lb/gal 8,850 lb APTF, V-093 1,000 gal Liquid 0.59 lb/gal 590 lb APTF, V-1349 600 ft3 at 5,000 psig Gas 1.48 lb/ft3 888 lb APTF, V-575 470 ft3 at 5,000 psig Gas 1.48 lb/ft3 696 lb Coca, V-099 200,015 ft3 at 60 psig Gas 0.027 lb/ft3 5,400 lb Coca-1, V-100 400,000 gal * Liquid 0.59 lb/gal 236,000 lb Coca-1, V-711 470 ft3 at 3,000 psig Gas 0.93 lb/ft3 437 lb Coca-1, V-714 470 ft3 at 3,000 psig Gas 0.93 lb/ft3 437 lb Coca 1, V-715 470 ft3 at 3,000 psig Gas 0.93 lb/ft3 437 lb Coca-4, Delta-4 Flight Tank 110,000 gal Liquid 0.59 lb/gal 64,900 lb *Vessel capacity is 500,000 gal, but it is only filled to 80% of the available volume by administrative decision Cryogenic liquid hydrogen is stored at a temperature of minus 423?F in insulated vessels (wrapping for the Delta-4 flight tank, vacuum-jackets for the other tanks). Vessel V-099 stores hydrogen gas at ambient temperature and a relatively low pressure. A compressor station located at Coca compresses hydrogen gas from this vessel up to 5,000 psig; the compressed gas is then conveyed by pipeline to the other locations, where it is stored in horizontal pressure vessels. Hydrogen is used at SSFL for both structural (Delta-4 flight tank) and fire tes ts, such as at APTF. Rocket components are tested using a highly instrumented system, which transfers liquid hydrogen to the test article using compressed gaseous hydrogen. In rocket engine components hot fire tests, liquid oxygen is fed concurrently, and an ignition source initiates the combustion of the two gases to form water (steam). A computerized program controls test conditions, including stopping the test if parameters fall outside preset ranges (an active mitigation measure). All personnel monitor tests from inside a reinforced control room (block house). The equipment is used intermittently, when a test series is performed. 1.3 Offsite Consequence Analysis An offsite consequence analysis was performed for a worst-case scenario, which involves, in compliance with CalARP regulations [California Code of Regulations (CCR), Title 19, Division 2, Chapter 4.5, Sections 2750.2 and 2750.3], vaporization of the greatest amount of hydrogen held in a single vessel, namely 236,000 lb (Vessel V-100), resulting in a vapor cloud explosion. It should be noted that, due to the unconfined equipment arrangement at SSFL, this occurrence can be considered highly unlikely. No passive mitigations, such as blast walls, were considered. The distance to the CalARP-specified endpoint (an overpressure of 1 psi) was determined using a USEPA-supplied equation. At an overpressure of 1 psi, shattering of glass windows and failure of wood siding and corrugated steel or aluminum would be expected, with hazard to personnel limited to what may result from flying glass. The endpoint reached was 3,627 ft (0.69 mile), a distance located entirely within the SSFL boundary. 1.4 General Accidental Release Prevention Program and Chemical-Specific Prevention Steps A prevention program is in place to minimize the risk of hydrogen releases in accordance with the OSHA PSM rule. This program is based on the following key elements: ? High level of training of the operators ? Preventiv e maintenance ? Use of state-of-the-art process and safety equipment ? Use of accurate and effective operating procedures, written with participation of the operators ? Performance of a hazard review of equipment and procedures ? Implementation of an auditing and inspection program. Chemical-specific prevention steps include availability of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), fire-resistant suits, face goggles and face shields, awareness of the hazardous properties of hydrogen, and presence of hydrogen detectors. 1.5 Five-Year Accident History No accidental releases from hydrogen processes that resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant property damage onsite, or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental damage (CalARP regulations, Section 2750.9) have occurred at SSFL in the past five years. 1.6 Emergency Response Program Two emergency response plans are in place: the Master Emergency Plan and facility-specific Emergency Response Plans. The latter include alert systems, notification procedures, and evacuation plans. The Boeing/Rocketdyne PSM/RMP coordinator is a member of the Local Emergency Response Planning Committee (LEPC, California Region 1). Emergency response drills and drill evaluations are conducted periodically. Emergency operation and response procedures are also reviewed at the start of a new test series. 1.7 Planned Changes to Improve Safety Process Hazard Analyses (PHA) of the hydrogen systems were performed, using the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) procedure. For APTF, this was completed in August 1997. For Coca operations, a PHA was performed in April 2000. Action items requiring replacements or modifications, review, or further investigations, were identified and addressed. These included technical items, such as installation of new mitigation or control equipment, and procedural/managerial items, such as improved maintenance or training. |