Ameripol Synpol Corporation-Odessa Plant - Executive Summary |
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Ameripol Synpol Corporation's Odessa Plant primary goal is the protection of the environment and the community. We will conduct our operations in a responsible, healthful, safe, and environmentally sound manner through compliance with all applicable environmental, health and safety laws, regulations, and company policies and procedures. In keeping with this policy, our objective is to reduce waste and continually reduce any impact on air, water, and land that we may have, through the implementation of effective environmental controls and training of our employees. It is Ameripol Synpol Corporation's policy to take every precaution possible to insure that a release of a hazardous substance does not occur. If a release of a hazardous substance does occur that all personnel are properly trained to react to and correct the release before it can reach harmful limits. All plant personnel are trained in emergency response to chemical releases. Specia l teams are assigned and trained on each shift to deal with any possible release of hazardous chemicals. All plant personnel are trained annually on emergency response procedures. The emergency response procedure is exercised at least once every three months. The exercises are evaluated and the results briefed to senior management and plant personnel. Emergency response agencies from the city of Odessa are included in some of the exercises conducted with in the plant. All information on chemicals used in the plant is available to all personnel 24 hours a day. Plant drawings are readily available to all personnel via computer and paper copies. All equipment safety ratings and safety equipment has been checked to insure that it complies with recognized and generally accepted Good Engineering Practices. An exhaustive review of each part of each process has been accomplished to identify any possible hazards, and to implement any engineering or administrative controls that were necessary to insure the safety of employees and the surrounding community. PROCESS DISCRIPTION AND REGULATED CHEMICALS Ameripol Synpol Odessa Plant manufactures 260MM pounds of synthetic rubber per year. The primary raw materials are Styrene and Butadiene with various additives such as carbon black, and soaps. The process uses two regulated chemicals that fall under the Risk Management Plan rule; ammonia and butadiene. The maximum intended inventory for ammonia is 58,026 pounds and maximum intended inventory in one of our butadiene storage vessels is 1,153,000 pounds. We have two storage vessels. WORST-CASE RELEASE SCENARIO FOR 1,3 BUTADIENE DESCRIPTION OF CASE Per the regulation, the worst case assumes the rupturing of one of the storage vessels. The entire contents of 1,153,00 pounds of butadiene is assumed to be released to the atmosphere in ten minutes. The butadiene it then assumed to contact an igni tion source and detonate. A pressure wave of 1 psig would extend out for 0.84 miles. A 1-psig force will knock a person down. The estimated residential population within this distance is 1523. The storage tank is located 0.38 miles from the North property line. ALTERNATIVE RELEASE CASE (MOST LIKELY) FOR 1,3 BUTADIENE DESCRIPTION OF CASE A rail car containing 30,000 gallons of butadiene tips over and cracks. The contents of the rail car are released in 20 minutes. Based on the RMP's Offsite Consequence Analysis document, one has to consider several scenarios for the alternative release case. They are vapor cloud fire, pool fire, BLEVE, vapor cloud explosion, and a jet fire from a hole. We eliminated the jet fire case since the butadiene is stored under relatively low pressure (<50 psig). A BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) is associated wit h a vessel rupture due to exposure to fire. The RMP literature considers BLEVE's to be unlikely cases. The rail car is more likely to fail due to the impact of derailing rather than an external fire. We considered a pool fire case even though the butadiene will rapidly evaporate into a vapor. Consequences of this case: The distance from the rail car to a radiant heat exposure of 5 Kilowatts per square meter was calculated to be 1917 feet. There would not be any residential population within this distance. At 5 kilowatts per square meter, a person would receive 2nd degree burns is exposed for 40 seconds. WORST CASE -TOXIC GASES (AMMONIA) DESCRIPTION OF CASE A complete failure of the ammonia storage tank occurs and the Maximum possible inventory of 58,026 pounds of ammonia is released. The time for entire contents to vaporize and enter the a tmosphere is 10 minutes. The wind speed is 3.4 miles per hour. Based on the EPA Model Program for Ammonia the distance to the (EPRG-2) endpoint is 2.7 miles. Estimated residential population within distance to endpoint is 26,155. A person exposed to EPRG-2 can be exposed for one hour without permanent health effects. ALTERNATIVE RELEASE CASE - TOXIC GASES (MOST LIKELY) DESCRIPTION OF CASE Based on plant history, the most likely case is a release of ammonia via a relief valve. A relief valve is designed to prevent overpressure of a pressure vessel Calculations indicate that there would not be any off-site consequences with this type of release. Alternate Release Case Studied A 1/2" liquid hole develops in an ammonia line hydraulically full of liquid or a storage tank. The pressure inside the pipe or tank is 150 psig. The calculated release rate is 353 lbs/min releasing 3,520 pounds. Using EPA's Model Program for Ammonia the, distance to end point (EPRG-2) is 0.24 mi. The wind speed is 3.0 m/sec. A person exposed to EPRG-2 can be exposed for one hour without permanent health effects. Estimated residential population within distance to endpoint: 0 PREVENTIVE MEASURES PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION The latest chemical information is available on computer and paper copies for all employees to use in doing their jobs. Plant drawings are available on computer and on paper copies for ready reference. Equipment ratings are on computer, on file and on the equipment for ready reference. Pressure relief and gas monitors are tested and maintained on a regularly scheduled basis. Documentation is mai ntained in our Process Safety Management Office verifying that our equipment complies with Recognized and generally accepted Good Engineering Practices. PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS An exhaustive review of each part of each process has been conducted to identify hazards associated with the process. From this process recommendations were made as to engineering and administrative controls which have been put into place. OPERATING PROCEDURES Operating Procedures are developed for each process for normal startup and shutdown, and emergency shutdown. These procedures are updated as changes occur in the process. Operators are trained and tested on each procedure that covers a process that they are working in. They must pass a written test and a practical performance test before they are q ualified to work in any process. MECHANICAL INTEGRITY Equipment is verified for appropriate use. The equipment is inspected and tested to insure its safety. MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE Administrative systems are in place to insure that any changes made to the process are evaluated and approved. Changes must also be reflected in Process Safety Information, Procedures and training must be provided to all employees that work in that process. PRE STARTUP REVIEW Each new unit must be evaluated for proper construction, safety systems, and proper operating procedures. Training is conducted before the unit is put into operation. COMPLIANCE AUDITE The PSM program is audited every three years. INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS Any safety incident must be investigated t o find the cause and implement preventive measures. EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION All affected employees must be consulted and trained on the changes to the process. CONTRACTORS All contractors safety records are reviewed. Contractors are trained on plant procedures and process overview. EMERGENCY RESPONSE Procedures are in place and training has been conducted. Drills are conducted every quarter to test our people on their proficiency. FIVE YEAR ACCIDENT HISTORY The Ameripol Synpol Corporation Odessa plant has never experienced a release meeting the definition in 40 CFR 68.42. (Deaths, Injuries, Evacuations, Significant Property Damage). |