SNF Holding Company - Riceboro, GA Facilities - Executive Summary

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                       EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This Risk Management Plan (RMP) has been prepared to meet the requirements of the Risk 
Management Program Rule.  The RMP covers the following facilities which are under common 
control by SNF Holding Company (SNF):  Chemtall Incorporated, and NCF Manufacturing, Inc. 
 
As part of complying with the Risk Management Program Rule, SNF has reviewed and enhanced 
previously existing accidental release procedures and emergency response policies.  These 
policies include: 
                   Emergency Response Program 
                   Emergency Action Plan 
                   Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plan 
                   Process Safety Management Plan 
                   Hurricane and Tropical Storm Plan 
                   First Responder Team 
                   Hazard Communication Plan 
                   Hazardous Waste Management Plan 
                   StormWater Pollution Prevention Plan 
                   Safe Work Pr 
actices 
                   Hazmat/Hazwoper Team 
 
There are four substances at the SNF facility that are regulated by the Chemical Accident 
Prevention Provisions defined at 40 CFR 68.  These substances are used in various processes 
throughout the facility to produce water treatment polymers.  These substances and the specific 
processes covered include: 
 
    Toxic Substances: 
 
         Methyl chloride: This material is used in the chloromethylation (CM) plant at Chemtall.  
    The CM Plant uses methyl chloride as a reactant to produce quaternized monomers that 
    are subsequently used in other facility processes to produce water treatment chemicals.  
    The CM plant products are also sold to off-site customers.  The maximum quantity of 
    methyl chloride stored on-site is 210,000 pounds. 
 
         Ammonium hydroxide: Ammonium hydroxide is received and stored at the facility as a 
    30 percent aqueous solution.  Ammonium hydroxide is used in Chemtall's emulsion plant 
    pro 
cesses for batch neutralization to produce emulsion polymers.  The maximum amount 
    of 30 percent ammonium hydroxide stored on-site is 50,000 pounds (15,000 pounds pure 
    ammonia). 
 
         Formaldehyde: Formaldehyde is used as a reactant in Chemtall's Mannich process.  
    Formaldehyde is received and stored as a 50 percent solution in water.  The maximum 
    amount of 50 percent formaldehyde stored on-site is 96,000 pounds (48,000 pounds pure 
    formaldehyde). 
 
    Flammable Substances: 
 
         Dimethylamine: Dimethylamine (DMA) is also used in the Mannich process as a 
    reactant.  Dimethylamine is received and used as a 60 percent solution in water.  The 
    maximum amount of 60 percent dimethylamine stored on-site is approximately 200,000 
    pounds (120,000 pounds pure dimethylamine). 
 
As required by the Risk Management Program Rule, worst-case and alternate (or realistic) 
release scenarios were evaluated and discussed in this RMP.  As required, worst-case sce 
narios 
are presented in the RMP for one toxic substance and one flammable substance.  Alternate 
scenarios were prepared for each of the toxic substances with worst-case endpoints located 
offsite (methyl chloride, formaldehyde, and ammonium hydroxide) and for one flammable 
substance to represent all flammable substances.  The endpoint represents the distance at which a 
released substance must travel before it disperses sufficiently to no longer pose a hazard to the 
public.   
 
For the worst-case scenario, EPA has defined a worst-case release as the release of the largest 
quantity of a regulated substance from a vessel or process line failure that results in the greatest 
distance to a specified endpoint.  For the worst-case analysis, the possible causes of the 
worst-case release or the probability that such a release might occur are not considered.  The 
release is simply assumed to take place by suddenly releasing the entire contents of the vessel.  
The results of the worst-case scenario  
analysis were as follows: 
 
         Toxics: The methyl chloride storage tank was assumed to fail and to instantaneously 
    release the entire tank contents.  No passive mitigation controls were considered in 
    limiting the release impacts.  The distance to the toxic endpoint was estimated to be less 
    than 1.06 miles. 
 
         Flammables: The DMA storage tank was assumed to fail and subsequently produce an 
    instantaneous release of the entire tank contents that results in a vapor cloud explosion.  
    No passive mitigation controls were considered in limiting the release impacts.  The 
    distance to the explosion endpoint was estimated to be less than 0.37 miles. 
 
 
Alternate release scenarios are more realistic scenarios that result in off-site endpoints.  For 
methyl chloride, ammonium hydroxide, and formaldehyde, releases were assumed to occur as a 
result of the uncoupling or rupture of a transfer hose during unloading operations for each 
substance.  For flammable ma 
terials, the alternate release scenario assumed that dimethylamine 
was released as a result of the uncoupling or rupture of a hose during unloading operations.  The 
results of the alternate release scenario analysis were as follows:  
 
         Ammonium hydroxide: In the alternate scenario, 6,600 pounds of ammonium hydroxide, 
    30 percent (2,000 pounds pure ammonia) were assumed to be released.  The release was 
    assumed to be mitigated because the transfer operation is monitored closely by personnel.  
    The release was assumed to occur over a 5-minute period.  The distance to the toxic 
    endpoint for this scenario was 0.31 miles. 
 
         Formaldehyde:  In the alternate scenario, 8,500 pounds of formaldehyde, 50 percent 
    (4,200 pounds pure formaldehyde) were assumed to be released.  The release was 
    assumed to be mitigated because the transfer operation is monitored closely by personnel.  
    The release was assumed to occur over a 5-minute period.  The distance 
to the toxic 
    endpoint for this scenario was 0.19 miles. 
 
         Methyl chloride: For the alternate scenario, 6,900 pounds of methyl chloride were 
    assumed to be released.  The release was assumed to be mitigated because of leak 
    detector sniffers that detect leaks during the transfer operation and automatically shut- 
    down the transfer operation and alert personnel of the occurrence of leaks.  The release 
    was assumed to occur over a 2-minute time period.  The distance to the toxic endpoint for 
    this scenario was less than 0.37 miles. 
 
         Dimethylamine:  For the alternate scenario, 14,000 pounds of dimethylamine, 60 percent 
    (8,700 pounds pure dimethylamine) were assumed to be released and result in a vapor 
    cloud fire. The release was assumed to be mitigated because the transfer operation is 
    monitored closely by personnel and the system is equipped with automated shut-off 
    valves.  The release was assumed to occur over a 5-minute ti 
me period.  The distance to 
    the endpoint for this scenario was less than 0.06 miles. 
 
To address potential accidental releases, an accidental release prevention program along with 
chemical specific prevention steps has been developed.  
 
Ammonium Hydroxide: The ammonium hydroxide prevention program includes the following 
process controls and mitigation systems: 
                   Vents 
                   Relief valves 
                   Check valves 
                   Backup pump 
                   Scrubbers 
                   Manual shutoffs 
                   Automatic shutoffs 
                   Interlocks 
                   Alarms and procedures 
                   Dikes 
 
 
Formaldehyde: The formaldehyde prevention program includes the following process controls 
and mitigation systems: 
                   Vents 
                   Check valves 
                   Backup pump 
                   Scrubbers 
                   Manual shutoffs 
                   Autom 
atic shutoffs 
                   Interlocks 
                   Alarms and procedures 
                   Grounding equipment 
                   Dikes 
 
Dimethylamine: The dimethylamine prevention program includes the following process controls 
and mitigation systems: 
                   Vents 
                   Relief valves 
                   Check valves 
                   Backup pump 
                   Scrubbers 
                   Manual shutoffs 
                   Automatic shutoffs 
                   Interlocks 
                   Alarms and procedures 
                   Grounding equipment 
                   Rupture disks 
                   Excess flow device 
                   Purge system 
                   Dikes 
                   Water cannons 
                   Process area detectors 
 
Methyl chloride: The methyl chloride prevention program includes the following process 
controls and mitigation systems: 
                   Vents 
                   Emerge 
ncy air supply 
                   Relief valves 
                   Check valves 
                   Backup pump 
                   Scrubbers 
                   Manual shutoffs 
                   Automatic shutoffs 
                   Interlocks 
                   Alarms and procedures 
                   Emergency power 
                   Grounding equipment 
                   Rupture disks 
                   Excess flow device 
                   Quench system 
                   Sprinkler system 
                   Process area detectors 
 
Also included in the prevention program for the four substances listed above include the 
following programs, practices and procedures: 
 
                   Emergency Response Program 
                   Emergency Action Plan 
                   Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plan 
                   Process Safety Management Plan 
                   Hurricane and Tropical Storm Plan 
                   First Responder Team 
 
               Hazard Communication Plan 
                   Hazardous Waste Management Plan 
                   StormWater Pollution Prevention Plan 
                   Safe Work Practices 
                   Hazmat/Hazwoper Team 
                   Operator Training 
                   Operating procedures 
 
Additionally, the facility has programs to address the OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) 
requirements. for several chemicals including methyl chloride, dimethylamine, and 
formaldehyde. 
 
The facility also has an emergency response program (ERP) that has been enhanced as part of 
implementing the Risk Management Program Rules.  The ERP has historically been coordinated 
with the Liberty County Sheriff's and Fire Department, Liberty Memorial Medical Center, 
Liberty-Hinesville Emergency Management Agency, Life Star Rescue Helicopter, and Memorial 
Medical Center in Savannah, and will continue to be coordinated in this manner.  As part of the 
community involvement efforts, the followi 
ng activities are coordinated with the departments 
and agencies listed above: 
                   Pre-emergency tours 
                   Emergency action drills 
                   Community evacuation procedures 
                   Material safety data sheets 
                   Responsibility roles in evacuation procedures 
 
Also, the facility has a supervised alarm system with United Alarms. United Alarms will notify 
the Fire Department and the Police Department in case of an emergency. 
 
As part of preparing the RMP, the facility's five year accident history was reviewed.  One release 
was identified that involved off-site injuries related to the release of methyl chloride from 
Chemtall's chloromethylation plant reactor.  Due to the unusually high pressure in the reactor, 
the pressure relief valve on the reactor vessel opened releasing part of the reactor contents to a 
containment vessel.  However, due to the high pressure, the vessel manway gasket also blew out 
and released methyl c 
hloride into the atmosphere.  The accident was believed to have been 
caused by excess iron in the methyl chloride which subsequently acted as a catalyst for 
polymerization of the product monomer.  As a result of this release, Chemtall has modified the 
process by installing a magnetic filter between the methyl chloride storage tank and the reactors 
and by increasing the relief vent line size.  
 
SNF is committed to continuous improvement of safety.  Planned changes and policies to 
promote this improvement include continuous review and update of the facility's ERP and 
various environmental, health, and safety polices, procedures, and practices. These include all the 
programs and plans listed above in the prevention programs as well as safety incentive programs 
to promote employee safety and community awareness programs.
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