#1 Chlorine Station - Executive Summary

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                       EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
    The Canadian River Municipal  Water Authority uses chlorine,  a hazardous material, 
which makes it necessary to observe certain safety precautions to prevent unnecessary exposure, 
to reduce the threat to our personal health as well as that of the community.  It is our policy to 
adhere to all applicable Federal and State rules and regulations.  Safety depends upon the manner 
in which we handle chlorine, the safety devices used in each facility  and the training of our 
employees. 
 
    The  Authority supplies raw water to member cities and uses chlorine to control biological 
activity in the aqueduct.  This is done by injection at four chlorine stations.  These stations are 
located at; 1)  #1 Chlorine Station 1 1/4 miles NW of the city of Sanford, Texas, 2) Borger 
Chlorine Station at 1800 So. Florida, Borger, Texas; 3)Amarillo Chlorine Station at 24 th and 
Fritch Hwy in Amarillo, Texas; and 4) Kress Chlorine Station, 1 mile NNW of Kress, Tex 
as on 
Hwy 87.  Access to all of these sites is restricted to authorized employees and authorized 
contractors.  The maximum chlorine stored at each of these facilities: 
    #1 Chlorine Station      8000 pounds 
    Borger Chlorine Station  4000 pounds 
    Amarillo Chlorine Station     8000 pounds 
    Kress Chlorine Station   4000 pounds 
Maximum total inventory            24000 pounds 
 
    The following are the worst-case release scenarios and the alternative release scenarios 
with administrative controls and mitigation measures to limit the distances for each reported 
scenario. 
 
    #1 Chlorine Station 
         Worst Case Scenario - failure of all (4) 1-ton cylinders simultaneously would 
release 8000 pounds of chlorine,  assumed to be in the form of vapor.  The distance to the 
endpoint of 0.0087 mg/L (3 ppm), using the EPA RMP*(TM) model, will be 4.20 miles. 
         Alternate Release Scenario - A pipe (tubing) failure allows a leak of 1840 pounds 
for 35 minutes. The distanc 
e to the endpoint of 0.0087 mg/L (3 ppm), using the EPA RMP*(TM) 
model, will be 0.60 miles. 
 
    Borger Chlorine Station 
         Worst Case Scenario - failure of both 1-ton cylinders simultaneously would release 
4000 pounds of chlorine,  assumed to be in the form of vapor.  The distance to the endpoint of 
0.0087 mg/L (3 ppm), using the EPA RMP*(TM) model, will be 3.00 miles. 
         Alternate Release Scenario - A pipe (tubing) failure allows a leak of 920 pounds 
for 35 minutes.  The distance to the endpoint of 0.0087 mg/L (3ppm), using the EPA RMP*(TM) 
model, will be 0.60 miles. 
 
 
 
 
    Amarillo Chlorine Station 
         Worst Case Scenario - Failure of all 4 1-ton cylinders simultaneously would release 
8000 pounds of chlorine,  assumed to be in the form of vapor.  The distance to the endpoint of 
0.0087 mg/L (3ppm), using the EPA RMP*(TM) model, will be 4.2 miles. 
         Alternate Release Scenario - A pipe (tubing) failure allows a leak of 1840 pounds 
for 35 minutes.  The dis 
tance to the endpoint of 0.0087 mg/L (3ppm), using the EPA RMP*(TM) 
model, will be 0.60 miles. 
 
    Kress Chlorine Station 
         Worst Case Scenario - Failure of 2 1-ton cylinders simultaneously would release 
4000 pounds of chlorine,  assumed to be in the form of vapor.  The distance to the endpoint of 
0.0087 mg/L (3ppm), using the EPA RMP*(TM) model, will be 3.0 miles. 
         Alternate Release Scenario - A pipe (tubing) failure allows a leak of 1400 pounds 
for 180 minutes. The distance to the endpoint of .0087 mg/L (3ppm), using the EPA RMP*(TM) 
model will be 0.60 miles. 
 
    The Canadian River Municipal Water Authority will comply with EPA's Accidental 
Release Prevention Rule and with all applicable state codes and regulations.  Employees who 
work with the chlorination system are trained to safely handle, operate, and maintain the chlorine 
cylinders and chlorinators.   The existing chlorination system has been designed according to good 
engineering practice and standards.  T 
he system has been in service for many years with little, if 
any, change in operation.  We operate our system to maintain the process as it was designed and 
not on a "fix it when it breaks down" schedule. 
 
    An accidental release occurred on July 26, 1996.  There were no injuries.  There were 
some leaves on a tree that were damaged and the adjacent roads were closed for about 30 
minutes.  The Tulia Fire Department assisted with backup and support.  
 
     The Texas Tier Two Emergency Response Program is the basis for dealing with chlorine 
leaks, and is updated annually. 
 
    The following are planned changes to improve chlorine response safety: 
    1)   Purchase a level "A" vapor protective suit, and train people how to use it.  This is  
         to be used in conjunction with the local LEPC response. 
    2)   Send 2 maintenance people to a seminar for Chlorine Operations. 
    3)   Have emergency response training for the people who respond to a chlorine leak.  
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