Matheson Gas Products - Newark California Facility - Executive Summary |
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Executive Summary : Matheson Gas Products maintains a detailed safety program as defined in the "Matheson Gas Products Operations Safety Manual". This manual was formalized on July 1, 1997 and covers the Corporate Safety Policy, Matheson Gas Product's Safety Code and Emergency Response Plans. These procedures and plans are maintained by Matheson's Corporate Compliance Officer at the Matheson Gas Products Newark, CA facility. Matheson Gas Products safety manual defines the Emergency Coordinator, Incident Commander, etc., and outlines their Emergency Response Plan, and Regulatory Inspection Guidelines. The policies that equate to an Accident Release Prevention policy or an Emergency Response policy are found in Matheson's Corporate Safety Policy, Safety Code, and Process Safety Management Policy. The actual procedures under the Process Safety Policy are under the Emergency Response portion of the Corporate Safety Manual, and address many of the items raised in the RMP requirement s. In addition the Newark facility has an Emergency Response Team Packet containing work instructions, emergency response procedures and liquid and gas release response actions. Those documents are available for agency review at the Matheson Gas Products Newark facility. The stationary source defined in the RMP regulation is the Matheson Gas Products Newark facility. That source stores and handles the following gases covered by RMP's program: Arsine; Boron trichloride; Chlorine; Diborane; Hydrogen chloride; Hydrogen fluoride; Phosphine; Acetylene; Dichlorosilane; Silane, and Trichlorosilane. The worst case release scenarios were Boron trichloride and the Chlorine, One Ton Unit. The worst case model shows this required release scenario. The alternative release scenario shows a reasonable release, based on engineering calculations, over the appropriate period of time. The estimated distance to the toxic endpoint was 1.3 miles for Chlorine, and a 1.8 mile distance for Boron trichl oride. There are no environmental receptors in these dispersion isopleths. The population in this zone consists of commercial, residential and industrial facilities. The closest residential area is an apartment complex, approximately one-tenth of a mile. The public receptors within the largest 1.8 mile isopleth are: 12 schools; one regional shopping center; 6 local shopping centers, 9 community parks, 2 recreational complexes, one library and Newark's Civic Center. The alternative toxic gas release scenarios used the required ten-minute release timeframe with the process gases being discharged through the on-site scrubber. The distances to the toxic endpoints for the alternative release scenarios were 1.8 miles for Boron trichloride, and 1.3 miles for Chlorine. There are no environmental receptors in these isopleths. The public receptors are manufacturing facilities, light industrial areas and a small section of residential property without schools, shopping centers or public p arks. The worst-case release scenario using 15% Diborane resulted in a distance to toxic endpoint of 1,044 feet. There are no environmental receptors in this isopleth. The public receptors are manufacturing facilities and light industrial areas. There are no residences, schools, shopping centers or public parks in the isopleth. The alternative release scenario using 15% Diborane resulted in no off-site consequences. The worst-case toxic release scenario using 1% Diborane resulted in a distance to toxic endpoint of 384 feet. There a re no environmental receptors in this isopleth. The public receptors are manufacturing facilities and light industrial areas. There are no residences, schools, shopping centers or public parks in the isopleth. Hydrogen chloride, Hydrogen fluoride and Phosphine resulted in worst-case toxic release distances of 2,346 ft., 3,249 ft., and 4,374 ft., respectively. The alternative release scenarios resulted in no offsite consequences for Hydrogen chloride and Phosphine, and 3,174 ft., for Hydrogen fluoride. The worst-case flammable release scenario was Acetylene resulting in a lower flammable limit distance of 186 ft. The worst-case flammable release scenarios using Silane or Dichlorosilane, resulted in a distance to the flammable lower limit of 36 feet and less than 30 ft., respectively. The alternative release scenarios, using the scrubber as a means of diluting and discharging the release, without abatement (similar to the toxic alternative), results in no offsite consequences for lower flammable limits. The results for explosion limits and radiant heat are found in the chart "Matheson Gas Products - Newark California, Offsite Consequence Analysis". The general accident release prevention program and chemical specific prevention steps are found in Matheson's Corporate Safety Manual under Section 5, Process Safety, Section 3, Safety Code and Section 9, Emergency Response Plan. Various chemical safety prevention steps have been identified in the numerous prior Hazard and Operability Study, and are being identified in the Hazard Operability Study carried out by EORM in the "DRAFT - Risk Management and Prevention Program, Technical Information Document, Matheson Gas Products, Newark, California, November 1966, Appendix Four, Matheson HazOps Worksheets", and the 1999 Hazard Operability Studies were performed by BenTyler Enterprises, Inc. The emergency response program found in Matheson's Corporate Safety Manual under Section 8, Emergency Response and Section 9, Emergency Response Plan, outlines the steps to be taken in case of an accidental release, lists the responsible parties and their responsibilities and defines required training and incident documentation. There are no formal lines of communication between Matheson and the local authorities or local / regional emergency response contractors. Personal Protection Equipment and emergency response equipment are identified in the Safety Manual under Section 9, Emergency Response Plan, Minimum PPE and Equipment Required at each Site. Changes which are improving safety are underway (Spring, 1999) at the Newark facility. There are various facility renovations, improvements in on-site parking, truck access roads and employee pathways. The results of current Hazard Operability Studies and other programs will aid in the planning of additional projects that will improve safety. |