Inglewood Gas Plant - Executive Summary

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1.0  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1.1  Accidental Release Prevention and Emergency Response Policies 
 
It is the policy of Stocker that its employees, environment, property, and the general public be protected from any harm that may occur as a result of its operations.  To achieve this end, Stocker strives to operate its facilities in compliance with applicable federal, state, and local safety, health, and environmental regulations.   
 
Stocker's emergency response policies are implemented to comply with the overall Stocker policy of providing its workers with a safe workplace and minimizing risk to the public.  This is considered to be of prime importance; therefore, all procedures must be carried out in the appropriate manner.  The safety of emergency and non-affected personnel must have priority.  Only then can safely executed rescue and medical activities be considered.  Another priority is protection of the environment.  Only after life, safety, and environmental concerns are addressed will t 
he focus shift to the secondary issues of property conservation and business recovery. 
 
1.2  Facility Description 
 
The Inglewood Field is located at 5640 South Fairfax Ave in metropolitan Los Angeles, seven miles west-southwest of downtown Los Angeles.  The field covers most of the Baldwin Hills.  These hills project above the surrounding coastal plain by 300-400 feet.  The field is located in an unincorporated portion of Los Angeles County, except for a small northwest portion which lies within Culver City.   
 
The gas plant is situated near the north end of the Field.  The Filed is bordered in this area by the Kenneth Hahn State Recreational Area. The nearest public roadway, La Cienega Boulevard, bisects through the middle of the Inglewood Field in a north-south direction.  A map of the area is shown in Figure 1-1. 
The Kenneth Hahn State Recreational Area is approximately 900 feet (0.17 mile) to the north.  The park is considered a public receptor under the RMP regulation.  There are  
no designated environmental receptors nearby.  A public school is located 3,600 feet (0.68 mile) to the northwest of the gas plant which is outside the 1 psi overpressure limit (0.4 mile) for the worst case scenario.  The nearest residences are at even greater distances outside the limit of the 1 psi limit. 
 
The gas plant is designed to convert sweet field gas into pipeline quality sales gas and natural gas liquids (natural gasoline, propane, butane).  A diethanolamine (DEA) CO2 removal unit removes excess CO2 from the gas prior to final compression and shipping.  Since the sweet field gas contains only 1 ppm H2S, no desulfurization unit is required. 
 
Major process steps include the following: 
 
a) First stage compression and dewatering (1.3 psig to 36.3 psig); 
b) Second stage compression and dewatering (36.3 psig to 150 psig); 
c) Third stage compression and dewatering (150 psig to 475 psig); 
d) DEA CO2 removal and odor control; 
e) NGL separation, storage, and shipping (LTS Unit); and 
 
f) Safety relief (PSVs, vents, and flare).  
 
Two LPG bullets each have a working capacity of 22,500 gallons.  The natural gas liquids (NGL) storage tank has a working capacity of 20,000 gallons. 
 
1.3  Regulated Substances 
 
a) Liquefied LPG gas; 
b) Liquefied NGLs. 
1.4  Summary of Offsite Consequence Analysis Results 
 
The Offsite Consequence Analysis (OCA) first assumes a "worst-case" catastrophic (instantaneous) release of all LPG stored in one of two bullets each having a working capacity of 22,500 gallons, or approximately 93,623 pounds of LPG (propane, butane).  Similarly, the OCA assumes an "alternate-case" throttled (line break) release of all LPG stored in both bullets over a period of 10 minutes. 
 
The OCA was performed with the RMP*Comp version 1.06 consequence analysis program.  For a "worst-case" vapor cloud explosion, the estimated distance to 1 psi overpressure is approximately 2,112 feet (0.4 mile).  For the "alternate-case" vapor cloud explosion, the estimated distance to 1 
psi overpressure is approximately 1,056 feet (0.3 mile).  The nearest public receptor is about 1,200 feet away.  There are no designated environmental receptors nearby. 
 
1.5  Five-Year Accident History 
 
There are no prior incidents. 
 
1.6  Emergency Response Program Summary 
 
Stocker has developed written emergency response procedures to address all elements that may be encountered during planning, responding or following up to an emergency at the Inglewood facility.  Application of the emergency response procedures ensures compliance with OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1910.38 (Emergency Response Plans) and the emergency response element of PSM.  The basic concept of Stocker's emergency procedures are to provide a comprehensive approach for managing emergencies.  The four elements of this approach are prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. 
 
The ERP is designed to be applicable to any type of emergency that may affect Stocker and based on the concept that the elements of emergency resp 
onse are similar, regardless of the hazard.  The ERP comprises the following sections: 
 
1. Agency Interface and Response Planning; 
2. Public and Agency Notification; 
3. Emergency Medical Care; 
4. Emergency Response Actions; 
5. Emergency Equipment; 
6. Emergency Response Training; 
7. Incident Command System; and  
8. Plan Review and Update. 
 
In cases where the hazard requires a response that is unique and not covered by other elements, the ERP contains certain hazard-specific information.  Procedures for responding to the following emergencies are included in Stocker's emergency response procedures:  
 
a) Hazardous substance spill or release (i.e., flammable liquids or gases); 
b) Fires; 
c) Tornado or severe weather; and 
d) Bomb threats. 
 
Stocker's emergency response procedures serve as a guide for emergency control staff, company personnel, emergency assistance groups and law enforcement agencies that may be called upon to participate in controlling an emergency within the facility and sur 
rounding areas. These procedures include employee notification of emergencies and evacuation procedures for all emergency situations.   
 
1.7  Planned Changes to Improve Safety 
 
See the PHA document.
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