City of Burbank Public Service Department - Executive Summary

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ACCIDENTAL RELEASE PREVENTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE POLICIES 
 
The City of Burbank Public Service Department (City of Burbank PSD) facility has an emergency action plan in effect.  The Emergency Action Plan (Plan) is detailed in the Emergency Action Plan Manual, which is maintained at the facility and updated as necessary.  This Plan was designed to meet the following objectives: 
 
 1.)  To save lives. 
 2.)  To minimize and avoid injuries. 
 3.)  To protect the environment. 
 4.)  To minimize property damage. 
 
City of Burbank PSD maintains a safety committee whose members are the designated emergency coordinators for the facility.  The Plan provides the response organization and notification procedures, evacuation routes, chlorine health hazards, and mitigation procedures which will be implemented to respond effectively to emergency situations that may arise at the facility.  This Plan is reviewed and updated at least once per year.  This Plan was reviewed and updated to ensure compli 
ance with the PSM and RMP regulations, as well as to incorporate facility changes. 
 
City of Burbank PSD has coordinated emergency response efforts with the local fire department.  In the case of a chlorine-related emergency, it is the policy of City of Burbank PSD to evacuate and to allow the fire department and/or the chemical supplier to respond to the emergency. 
 
STATIONARY SOURCE AND REGULATED SUBSTANCE 
 
The City of Burbank PSD facility is located at 164 W. Magnolia Boulevard, Burbank, California 91502.  The system was constructed in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local regulations.  The facility is surrounded by chain link fence with access through one gate only.  Visitors are permitted to enter the facility by checking in with the guard. 
 
The Olive Power Plant chlorine system is operated under a vacuum.  One ton containers of chlorine are used to treat cooling tower water for the Olive Power Plant.  The chlorine gas leaving the container passes through a heate 
r and a vacuum regulator to ensure the chlorine is a gas before it reaches the flow controller.  After the flow controller, the chlorine is injected (by the injector) into the water line to create a chlorine solution.  The chlorine controller and chlorine analyzer regulate the flow of water through an electrically operated ball valve.  The incoming water and the outgoing solution are non-potable.  In an emergency, a metal rod is connected to the valve stem on the chlorine tank.  The metal rod passes through a hole in the wall and allows an operator to isolate the chlorine tank (by closing the valve) from outside of the building. 
 
Another chlorine system at the City of Burbank PSD facility, the Magnolia Power Plant, is currently not in service.  No chlorine is associated with the Magnolia Power Plant in any capacity, storage or otherwise.  The system is not currently used, nor is it planned to be used in the foreseeable future.  If the system is brought back on line, the required RMP fi 
ling will occur at that time. 
 
HAZARD ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 
 
*  Worst Case Release Result Summary 
 
     Scenario Description:  Release of the maximum quantity of chlorine that can be stored in a vessel (one-ton container) - 2,000 pounds in 10 minutes.  The most pessimistic meteorological conditions were used: 1.5 meters per second wind speed, and F stability.  No passive mitigation measures were taken into account as the release could occur outside.  The Risk Management Program Guidance for Waste Water Treatment Plants reference tables were used to determine the maximum distance to the toxic endpoint of 3 ppm in urban conditions. 
 
*  Alternative Release Result Summary 
 
    Scenario Description: A release of chlorine resulting from a material failure of a fusible plug (normally designed to melt between 158-165 F).  The release rate of chlorine based on chemical-specific considerations is 30 pounds per minute.  The meteorological conditions used were 1.5 meters per second wind speed, and  
F stability (a more conservative approach than the allowed conditions:  3.0 m/s and D stability).  No passive mitigation measures were taken into account as the release could occur outside.  A dispersion model for dense gas releases, Degadis, was used to determine the maximum distance to the toxic endpoint of 3 ppm in urban conditions. 
 
ACCIDENTAL RELEASE PREVENTION PROGRAM AND CHEMICAL-SPECIFIC PREVENTION STEPS 
 
The City of Burbank PSD chlorine systems have many safety features.  Much of the safety of the system is inherent in the policies and procedures that govern the operation of the system.  For example, the City of Burbank PSD facility operates in accordance with OSHA's Process Safety Management regulation and the California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) Program. 
 
There are chlorine detectors that trigger audible and visual alarms for the chlorine system.  The chlorine system at the Burbank PSD main site are connected to the facility's SCADA (data acquisition) system, wh 
ich pages operators in case of an emergency. 
 
In addition, common industry standards, policies, and procedures are utilized to ensure safe practices are being performed.  This includes common practices recommended by the Chlorine Institute. 
 
FIVE YEAR ACCIDENT HISTORY 
 
There have been no chlorine accidents at the facility since June 1994. 
 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM 
 
The City of Burbank Public Service Department (City of Burbank PSD) facility has an emergency action plan in effect.  The Emergency Action Plan (Plan) is detailed in the Emergency Action Plan Manual, which is maintained at the facility and updated as necessary.  This Plan was designed to meet the following objectives: 
 
 1.)  To save lives. 
 2.)  To minimize and avoid injuries. 
 3.)  To protect the environment. 
 4.)  To minimize property damage. 
 
City of Burbank PSD maintains a safety committee whose members are the designated emergency coordinators for the facility.  The Plan provides the response organization and noti 
fication procedures, evacuation routes, chlorine health hazards, and mitigation procedures which will be implemented to respond effectively to emergency situations that may arise at the facility.  This Plan is reviewed and updated at least once per year.  This Plan was reviewed and updated to ensure compliance with the PSM and RMP regulations, as well as to incorporate facility changes due to the renovation of the facility. 
 
City of Burbank PSD has coordinated emergency response efforts with the local fire department.  In the case of a chlorine-related emergency, it is the policy of City of Burbank PSD to evacuate and to allow the fire department and/or the chemical supplier to respond to the emergency. 
 
PLANNED CHANGES TO IMPROVE SAFETY 
 
The Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) provided mitigation measures to improve safety at the City of Burbank PSD facility located at 164 W. Magnolia Boulevard, Burbank, California 91502.   The recommendations are scheduled to be complete by June 1, 1999. 
 
 
HAZOP Study 
 
R01    Calculate the amount of heat that could be created during a fire in the cooling tower.  If it can heat the tank to 157 F the fuse plug would open.  (The heat would be from radiant energy.)  A cooling tower fire may not create enough heat to raise the temperature of the chlorine substantially. 
 
R02    Verify that the solenoid in the chlorine line shuts if there is a power outage.  
 
R03    Evaluate and develop a method to connect the chlorine detectors to a back-up power supply. 
 
R04    Maintain an Emergency Kit B on-site and ensure that all necessary personnel are instructed in how to use it.   
 
R05    If the Public Service Department plant does not want to be the responder to emergencies, this should be communicated to the Fire Department.  The Fire Department should come to the facility and perform drills with the PSD approximately once a year. 
 
R06    Ensure all employees, including the office employees, are made aware of all chemicals on-site.  A basic certificat 
ion form should be implemented. 
 
R07    Implement a procedure which has all tank change employees sign a sheet that they are trained and understand the tank change procedures.   
 
R08    Place orange caution cones around AHM delivery trucks to block and warn people that a chemical delivery is in progress. 
 
Note:   R09 through R20 addressed systems that are not subject to the RMP. 
 
Procedures Review 
 
R21    Formalize a form for the employees to sign which states that they have been trained in their required emergency response procedures and that they understand those procedures. 
 
What-If Walkthrough 
 
Note:   R22 addressed a system that is not subject to the RMP. 
 
R23    Install a plant-wide visual alarm system to notify all employees in case of an emergency AHM release (an audible alarm might not be noticed by operators working in noisy environments). 
 
Seismic Assessment 
 
Note:   S01 addressed a system that is not subject to the RMP. 
 
S02    Cylinders in use which contain AHM should be r 
estrained top and bottom with snugly fitted, robust chains so that they are unable to slide from under the chains.  The chain restraints should be attached to either a structural wall or, horizontal bars that can be connected to structural columns and the cylinders, in turn, can be secured to the bars. 
 
S03    Secure the timber cradles used to support one-ton chlorine cylinders to the floor and to the cylinders themselves.
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