Farallon-Cayey Filtration Plant - Executive Summary

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Compaqma de Aguas de Puerto Rico (CAPR) as operator of the Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer 
Authority (PRASA) system has developed a Risk Management Plan (RMP) for management and 
prevention of risks associated with the storage and use of chlorine, a regulated toxic substance, at 
the Farallon-Cayey Water Filtration Plant.  The RMP was prepared in compliance with 40 CFR 
Part 68 and Clean Air Act (CAA) Section 112(r)(1).  The Prevention Program elements build 
upon the facility's Process Safety Management (PSM) system prepared in compliance with 29 
CFR Part 1910.119.  
Accidental Release Prevention and Emergency Response Policies 
It is CAPR's policy to comply with applicable Federal and Puerto Rican requirements.  The 
chlorination process at the Farallon-Cayey Water Filtration Plant uses chlorine, a hazardous toxic 
substance regulated by EPA, OSHA, and PROSHO.  Due to the hazardous characteristics of 
chlorine, the Farallon-Cayey Water Filtration Plant observes various safety precautions in th 

storage, conveyance and use of chlorine.  The safety precautions are necessary to protect 
employees, contractors, and visitors at the Farallon-Cayey Water Filtration Plant and the 
immediately surrounding areas.  Safety precautions include procedures and equipment to minimize 
the potential for accidental release, as well as a written emergency response program for response 
to any chlorine release that may occur. 
The Stationary Source and Regulated Substances Handled 
The Farallon-Cayey Water Filtration Plant supplies water to the surrounding community.  Chlorine is used to disinfect the water, destroying microorganisms that could cause illness in humans. 
Chlorine is delivered to the facility via truck in ton containers.  The storage building has space for 
up to nine full containers, a total of 20,000 pounds of chlorine.  Chlorine containers are connected 
to vacuum chlorinators.  The chlorinators regulate chlorine use.  From the chlorinators, chlorine 
gas is distributed under vacuum  
to injectors.  The injectors combine the gaseous chlorine with 
water.  The chlorinated water is mixed with the water plant flow for disinfection. 
Worst -case and Alternative Release Scenarios 
The worst-case release scenario was determined following EPA's Risk Management Program 
Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance.  The worst-case release scenario is a vapor release of the 
entire contents of a ton container over a ten minute period (200 pounds of chlorine per minute).  
Other worst-case assumptions required by EPA include a low wind speed (1.5 meters per 
second), stable atmosphere (Class F), urban topography, and no active mitigation of the release. 
EPA requires the determination of the area (zone of vulnerability) which may be exposed to a 
chlorine concentration of 3 ppm or greater.  According to the American Industrial Hygiene 
Association, 3 ppm is the maximum concentration of chlorine in air below which nearly all people 
could be exposed for one hour without serious health effect 
s.  Based on the worst-case 
assumptions, the zone of vulnerability was determined to extend 1.3 miles from the chlorine 
storage area. 
The following are known to be within the zone of vulnerability for the worst-case release 
scenario: residences and recreation areas. 
Approximately 1,500 residents are located within a 1.3 mile radius of the 
chlorine storage area.  Many of these residents would not actually be impacted in even a 
worst-case release, as the chlorine would travel in the direction of wind. 
The conditions and parameters for the worst-case scenario are specified by EPA.  A more realistic 
alternative release scenario was examined, also following EPA's Risk Management Program 
Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance.  The alternative release scenario is a vapor release of the 
entire contents of a ton container through a broken 3/8 inch flexible connector tube.  If the 
container was not shut off, the contents would be released at a rate of 21 pounds of chlorine per 
minute over a 
95 minute period.  More typical weather conditions are also used (wind speed of 
3.0 meters per second, atmospheric stability Class D).  Other conditions remain the same as in the 
worst-case scenario (urban topography and no mitigation of the release). 
The zone of vulnerability for the alternative release scenario is determined to extend 0.1 miles from the chlorine storage area.  Approximately 7 residents are located within a 0.1 miles radius of the chlorine storage area.  These residents and recreation area could be impacted, depending on the direction of wind.  No known environmental receptors are located within the zone of vulnerability. 
General Accidental Release Prevention Program and Chemical-specific Prevention Steps 
CAPR complies with PROSHO requirements for Prevention Programs and for Process Safety 
Management.  Operators, maintenance staff and contractors are informed of chlorine hazards, and 
hazard signs are posted in the chlorine storage area.  Standard operating and mai 
procedures have been developed, and employees who work with chlorine are provided training. 
Emergency Response Program 
CAPR has an emergency response program.  Chlorine gas detectors are located within the storage 
area for early detection and warning of any leak.  Leak repair kits are maintained on site, and 
operators are trained in how to quickly stop any leak that may occur.  The emergency response 
program is coordinated with Civil Defense for notification of the public. 
CAPR periodically conducts various training programs, including emergency response training. All CAPR facilities are scheduled to recieve refresher training by September 30, 1999. 
Five-year Accident History 
Within the past five years there have been no unplanned releases of chlorine in excess of 10 
pounds resulting in injuries or significant property damage on site; or known offsite injuries, 
evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental damage. 
Planned Changes to Improve Safety 
CAPR uses Process Hazard Analyses (PHA) to identify and recommend changes to ensure a high 
level of safety.  Issues identified from a PHA are then addressed in CAPR's Prevention Program.  
Recommendations from the most recent PHA include more frequent training in operating and 
maintenance procedures, and an improved preventative maintenance program.  An audit of the 
RMP and PSM programs will be conducted within three years to verify the effectiveness of the 
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