Witco Fort Worth Plant - Executive Summary

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Offsite Consequence Modeling                  Date:  3/25/99 
Risk Management Program 
                     Witco Corporation 
     611 East Northside Drive, Fort Worth, Texas 76106 
                   RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 
                        August 1999 
                       Prepared by: 
                       Robert Durden 
                  Witco Fort Worth Plant 
                     TABLE OF CONTENTS 
POLICIES                                                   1 
SUBSTANCES                                                 1 
SUBSTANCES                                                 3 
1.3.1  WORST-CASE RELEASES                               3 
1.3.2  ALTERNATIVE CASE RELEASES                         3 
SUBSTANCES                                                 4 
1.4.1  WORST-CASE RELEASE                                4 
1.4.2  ALTERNATIVE CASE RELEASES                         5 
ARDS       6 
1.6.3  EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION                            7 
1.6.4  PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION                        7 
1.6.5  PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS (PHA)                     7 
1.6.6  OPERATING PROCEDURES                              8 
1.6.7  TRAINING                                          8 
1.6.8  CONTRACTOR SAFETY PROGRAM                         9 
1.6.9  PRE-STARTUP SAFETY REVIEWS                        9 
1.6.10  MECHANICAL INTEGRITY                             9 
1.6.11  SAFE WORK PRACTICES                             10 
1.6.12  MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE                            10 
1.6.13  INCIDENT INVESTIGATION                          10 
1.6.14   COMPLIANCE AUDITS                              11 
1.7.1  SPECIALIZED SAFETY FEATURES                      11 
1.8  FIVE-YEAR ACCIDENT HISTORY                           12 
1.10  P 
                      LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE                                                  Page 
 1     Table 1 Largest Quantity of Regulated             2 
 2     Table 2  Parameters for Calculating Worst-        3 
       Case Release Toxic Endpoint. 
 3     Table 3  Parameters for Calculating               4 
       Alternative Release Case Toxic Endpoint. 
 4     Table 4  Parameters for Calculating Flammable     5 
       Substances Worst-Case Release Endpoint (Vapor 
       Cloud Explosion to 1 psi overpressure). 
 5     Table 5  Parameters for Calculating               5 
       Alternative Release Case for Flammable 
       Substances Endpoint. 
Risk Management Plan:  Executive Summary 
1.1  Accidental Rele 
ase Prevention and Emergency Response 
Witco Corporation is committed to worker and public safety 
as our first priority.  It is our belief that those things 
which contribute to  safe operations also improve quality 
and reduce costs.   This commitment to safety can be seen in 
the investment of resources made for accident prevention. 
These efforts include extensive employee training, and a 
systematic approach to safety in the design, installation, 
operation, and maintenance of our processes.   Our policy is 
to implement effective controls to prevent foreseeable 
releases of dangerous substances.  To supplement these 
controls, additional safeguards are provided to reduce the 
impact of a release should one occur in spite of all 
precautions.   Plant employees and managers are trained to 
take appropriate action in an emergency to protect the 
welfare of the public, our employees and surrounding 
1.2  Description of the Stationary Source and Regulated 
Witco's Fort Worth Plant is a specialty surfactant 
manufacturing facility located at 611 East Northside Drive 
in Fort Worth, Texas.  The plant is situated on 
approximately 5 acres in north Fort Worth.  The immediate 
area surrounding this plant is open undeveloped land to the 
north, industrial development including Ferro Corporation 
and residential zoned areas lie to the west, 
commercial/residential zoned areas to the south, and the 
Trinity River to the east. 
Specialty surfactant manufacturing has been conducted at 
this location since 1974.  This facility makes a variety of 
specialty surfactants that are used in industrial and 
agricultural applications throughout the world.  The plant 
is operated 24 hours per day, seven days per week.  Plant 
manufacturing activity can be categorized into 4 major 
product lines employing a total of 44 people.  During normal 
operations, the plant is staffed by 5 hourly plant operators 
and 1 quality control technician.  Four m 
personnel and nine managers are present during normal office 
hours.  Maintenance and management personnel are on call 
after normal office hours.   Operators are organized as 
teams with extensive cross training enabling personnel to 
function in multiple roles. 
One of the four major product lines produced at this 
facility is the Morwet D-425 Dispersant.   This product was 
first produced in 1978.    35% formaldehyde solution is 
reacted with a sodium naphthalene process intermediate in 
two  batch reaction vessels.   The final product of this 
process is a water based surfactant with highly efficient 
dispersant properties.   This product is used in 
agricultural product formulations to retard sedimentation of 
water dispersible granules such as herbicides, insecticides, 
and fungicides..    The formaldehyde solution is supplied 
from a 10,400 gallon storage tank.   The maximum intended 
inventory is limited to 9824 gallons due to the presence of 
high level warning s 
ystems and procedures which prevent 
material additions beyond this level. 
A minor product line involves the manufacture of naphthalene 
based products.   One of those products, scheduled for 
initial production in August 1999, is  Di-Isopropyl 
Naphthalene.   This product is a process intermediate which 
is further processed at another Witco facility before being 
sold as an oil field drilling aid.   This initial 
manufacturing phase involves the reaction of propylene gas 
with naphthalene in the presence of a catalyst.   These two 
processes were identified during an evaluation of this 
facility's inventory of raw materials, finished products, 
and process intermediates to determine if any regulated 
flammable or toxic substances used or stored on site 
exceeded the threshold quantity.  The facility uses two 
regulated substances in two processes equal to or greater 
than the listed threshold quantities. This chemicals, 
process units, largest quantity on site, and listed 
ld quantities are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1  Largest Quantity of Regulated Substances 
Regulated Substance                    Largest          Thresho 
or Mixtures                            Quantity On      ld 
Containing          Process Unit       Site             Quantit 
Regulated                              (lbs.) 1         y 
Substances                                              (lbs) 
Formaldehyde 35%    R331 & R332        32,000           15,000 
Propylene           R332               40,000           10,000 
Based on worst-case analyses, the distances to endpoints 
[i.e., Emergency Response Planning Guideline level 2 (ERPG- 
2)] for formaldehyde exceed the distances to public 
receptors (i.e., off-site residences, institutions, 
industrial and commercial office buildings, parks, or 
recreational areas inha 
bited or occupied by the public). 
Worst-case analysis  for a propylene vapor cloud explosion 
also indicate distances to endpoints [i.e., distance to 1psi 
overpressure], which exceed the distance to public 
receptors.     The process using formaldehyde is exempt from 
coverage under the Occupational Safety & Health 
Administration (OSHA) Process Safety Management rule based 
on the concentration of the formaldehyde solution being less 
than 37%. 2  This facility's SIC code is 2841 (NAICS code 
325611) which is not among those listed in 68.10 (d) (1). 
The process using propylene is covered by the PSM rule and 
therefore requires level 3 prevention programs.  Although 
the first process may be classified as a program level 2, 
both are addressed with existing level 3 prevention programs 
already in place for PSM covered processes to maintain 
1.3  Off-Site Consequence Analysis Results - Toxic 
1.3.1  Worst-Case Releases 
The worst-case release scenario of 
formaldehyde assumes a 
catastrophic failure which spills the entire contents of the 
storage tank.  Endpoints for toxic substances are based on 
the ERPG-2.  These values are listed in Appendix A to 40CFR 
Part 68 (Table of Toxic Endpoints).  The conditions at the 
Fort Worth Witco Plant were reviewed to develop a model of 
the air dispersion pattern of toxic concentrations in the 
worst-case release. 
Table 2 shows the calculation parameters and distance to the 
toxic endpoint of  0.43 miles using the EPA Offsite 
Consequence Analysis Guidance and lookup tables.   The 35% 
formaldehyde solution is contained in an atmospheric storage 
tank.  Under the ARP Program [68.25(d)(3)], a regulated 
toxic substance that is normally liquid at ambient 
temperature is spilled instantaneously to form a liquid 
pool.  The surface area of the spilled liquid is used to 
calculate the volatilization rate.  This rate accounts for 
the highest daily maximum temperature occurring within the 
past thre 
e years, the material's temperature in the vessel 
and its concentration in solution.  The rate of release to 
air is determined from the volatilization rate of the liquid 
pool.   The duration studied is 10 minutes for worst-case 
Passive mitigation for the worst-case release include 
administrative limitations on the inventory of formaldehyde. 
The quantity of formaldehyde involved in the worst-case 
release is less than the capacity of the storage tank.  This 
is due to the employment of high-level warning systems and 
operating procedures which prohibit filling the storage tank 
beyond the point where the high level alarm sounds (9824 
gallons).  This practice ensures a minimum vapor space 
inside the tank with a capacity of 756 gallons. 
Additional passive mitigation is provided in the form of a 
concrete dike around the storage tank which would divert a 
spill to a containment pit.  This confinement of spilled 
material limits the surface area of a pool to no more th 
4,222 square feet and thus reduces the release rate to 5.25 
pounds per minute. 
Table 2  Parameters for Calculating Worst-Case Release Toxic 
  Regulated      Vapor    Spill  Releas   Wind   Distance 
Substances or    Pressu  Surfac  e Rate   Speed  to Toxic 
   Mixtures      re (mm  e Area  (lbs/m   (m/s)  Endpoint 
  Containing      Hg)      (Sq     in)               s 
  Regulated                ft)                    (miles) 
35% formaldehyde                                       
   Solution       8.79    4221    5.25     1.5     0.43 
1.3.2  Alternative Case Releases 
The alternative case release scenario represents a more 
likely event than a worst-case.   In selecting this 
scenario, operating experience suggested a scenario 
involving a hose failure represented a more credible release 
scenario than others considered.  In this scenario, a hose 
or hose fitting failure results in a release from a tank 
truck during the process of unloa 
ding.  The release consists 
of a 200 gallons per minute stream which continues for a 
period of ten minutes.  Endpoints for toxic substances 
remain the same as for the worst-case.   Those parameters 
which significantly influence differences in the scenario's 
outcome include wind speed and ambient temperature.  In the 
worst-case release, an ambient temperature of 112x F and 
windspeed of 1.5 meters per second is assumed.  In the 
alternative release case, more typical conditions are used. 
This includes a temperature of  77xF  and a windspeed of 3 
meters per second.   The expected reduction in evaporation 
due to lower ambient temperatures is offset by the greater 
windspeed.  Because of this, the release rate actually 
increases.  However,  the greater wind speed also more 
quickly disperses the toxic concentrations and thus shortens 
the distance to the toxic endpoint. 
Table 3 shows the calculation parameters and distance to the 
toxic endpoint of  0.19 miles using the EPA Of 
Consequence Analysis Guidance. 
Passive mitigation for the alternative release case  include 
spill diversion and confinement in a concrete sump pit.  The 
estimated surface area of the spill given the expected 
diversion path and sump area is approximately 4000 square 
feet.  This surface area is used square feet is used to 
calculate the evaporation rate.   Other factors which 
mitigate the release include requirements that the unloader 
be present and attend all unloading operations, the use of 
standard operating procedures, and hydraulic emergency 
shutoff valves installed on all trucks which make deliveries 
to this plant. 
Table 3  Parameters for Calculating Alternative Release Case 
Toxic Endpoint. 
  Regulated      Vapor    Spill  Releas   Wind   Distance 
Substances or    Pressu  Surfac  e Rate   Speed  to Toxic 
   Mixtures      re (mm  e Area  (lbs/m   (m/s)  Endpoint 
  Containing      Hg)      (Sq     in)               s 
  Regulated                ft)   
35% formaldehyde                                       
   Solution       7.47    4000    7.31     3.0     0.19 
1.4  Off-Site Consequence Analysis Results - Flammable 
1.4.1  Worst-Case Release 
The worst-case release scenario of propylene assumes a 
catastrophic failure which releases the entire contents of a 
tank truck container resulting in a vapor cloud explosion. 
The distance to endpoint is determined as the point where 
the overpressure drops below 1psi. 
Table 4 shows the calculation parameters and distance 1 psi 
overpressure endpoint of  0.28 miles using the EPA Offsite 
Consequence Analysis Guidance and lookup tables.   The 
largest quantity present on site occurs when a shipping 
container arrives for offloading.  This quantity accounts 
for the maximum capacity of the shipping container used to 
transport this material to the Witco Facility..  Under the 
ARP Program [68.25(e)], a worst-case scenario for a 
gulated flammable substance assumes the instantaneous 
release and vaporization of that substance resulting in a 
vapor cloud explosion.  A yield factor of 10% of the 
available energy released in the explosion shall be used to 
determine the distance to the explosion endpoint if the 
model used is based on the TNT-equivalent methods. 
Table 4  Parameters for Calculating Flammable Substances 
Worst-Case Release Endpoint (Vapor Cloud Explosion to 1 psi 
  Regulated      CAS    Molecula   Gas    LFL     Distance 
Substances or   Number  r Weight   Type  (mg/L     to 1psi 
  Mixtures                                 )     Overpressu 
 Containing                                      re (miles) 
  Propylene     115-07-   42.08   Dense    34       0.28 
1.4.2  Alternative Case Releases 
The alternative case release scenario represents a more 
likely event than  
a worst-case.   In selecting this 
scenario, engineering personnel agreed that a likely release 
via the shipping container's pressure relief system would 
represent a more likely event.   Although this scenario 
would not involve significant quantities, the alternative 
release scenario was calculated using a 5000 pound quantity. 
The release results in a vapor cloud fire where the offsite 
impacts were evaluated in terms of the distance to this 
material's lower flammability limit (LFL).  The distance to 
the LFL represents the maximum distance at which the radiant 
heat effects of a vapor cloud fire might have serious 
Table 5 shows the calculation parameters and distance to the 
radiant heat exposure endpoint of  0.06 miles using the EPA 
Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance reference table 21 
assuming a wind speed of 3.0 meters per second. 
Table 5  Parameters for Calculating Alternative Release Case 
for Flammable Substances Endpoint. 
CAS    Molecul   Qty     LFL    Distance 
Substances or    Number    ar     Releas  (mg/L)  to Lower 
   Mixtures              Weight     ed           Flammabili 
  Containing                      (lbs)           ty Limit 
  Regulated                                        (miles) 
  Propylene      115-07-  42.08    5000     34      0.06 
1.5  Additional Preventive and Mitigating Measures 
A combination of engineering and administrative controls 
make the occurrence of a worst-case release highly unlikely. 
They also significantly reduce the possibility of other less 
serious releases.  Process equipment design considers the 
consequences of a variety of atypical process scenarios and 
incorporates safeguards to prevent or minimize the effect of 
deviations in normal operating conditions.  Process 
equipment including vessels, piping, pumps, control systems 
and safety systems are in 
spected and maintained in 
accordance with a mechanical integrity program.   Critical 
operations are performed by trained personnel in accordance 
with standard operating procedures. 
1.6  General Accidental Release Prevention Program and 
Chemical-Specific Prevention Steps 
The following is a summary of the accident prevention 
programs in place at Witco's Fort Worth Plant.   The first 
section lists and explains engineering safeguards installed 
on the D-425 and the DIN processes.  The second section 
describes management systems intended to address process 
hazards from initial design and construction through on- 
going operation and maintenance. 
1.6.1  D-425 Condensation Process Safeguards 
Both reaction vessels and storage tank are protected from 
overpressure conditions with pressure relief devices or 
conservation vents.   During transfers from shipping 
container to storage tank, releases are prevented by a 
combination of level indicators and high level alarms which 

pprise personnel of the status of the transfer.   Process 
temperature is monitored from a control room where flow 
rates may be adjusted as needed.   Should a release occur in 
spite of these controls, secondary containment systems are 
designed to limit the movement and surface area.  All 
process activities are attended by operating personnel who 
are knowledgeable of process hazards and procedures for 
conducting emergency shutdowns. 
1.6.2  Di-Isopropyl Naphthalene Process Safeguards 
The shipping container meets strict DOT requirements for 
containers shipping liquefied petroleum gases.   All 
transfers are carried out in well ventilated areas which 
limit potential accumulations of flammable gas.   Transfers 
are attended by two operations personnel to ensure proper 
monitoring of all facets of the operation.    Emergency 
shutoff valves are located away from the unloading 
connections to facilitate their quick employment if needed. 
Pressure relief systems prevent overpress 
ure conditions for 
both the shipping container and the process reactor.  The 
process reactor is  protected from process deviations of 
pressure or temperatures through a system of interlocks 
which automatically stop the transfer of propylene under 
upset conditions. The pressure relief system for the reactor 
is piped to a safe location away from other processes. The 
process reactor relief system is connected to an alarm to 
signal operations personnel if a relief event occurs.   The 
unloading pipeline system is equipped with an emergency 
shutdown system that may be employed from a safe distance in 
the event of a hose failure during material transfer.  It 
is also equipped with a fusible link shutoff valve which is 
designed to automatically close if exposed to the heat of a 
fire..  Equipment ground systems are installed to prevent 
static electricity buildup during material transfers. 
1.6.3  Employee Participation 
Witco employees and management work together to manage 
process safety and accident prevention efforts.  Employees 
participate in safety action committee meetings and the 
decision making dialog in those meetings.  Employees also 
hold and participate in their own subcommittee meetings and 
make recommendations to this steering group.  Employees 
participate in process hazard reviews and in the development 
of operating procedures.  They assist in updating and 
verifying technical documents and chemical information. 
Employees have access to all information created as part of 
this facility's accident prevention program.  Employees are 
involved in developing and carrying out training, incident 
investigations, managements of change, and pre-startup 
safety reviews. 
1.6.4  Process Safety Information 
Technical information on process equipment, technology, and 
chemicals is maintained and used to ensure safe operation of 
the covered processes.  These documents address chemical 
properties and their associated hazards, limits for cr 
process parameters and specific chemical inventories, and 
equipment design and configuration details.  Specific 
departments are assigned responsibility for maintaining up- 
to-date process safety information. 
Chemical-specific information, including exposure hazards 
and emergency response/exposure treatment considerations, is 
provided in material safety data sheets (MSDSs).  This 
information is supplemented by documents that specifically 
address known corrosion concerns and any known hazards 
associated with inadvertently mixing of chemicals.   For 
specific covered process areas, Witco Fort Worth has 
documented safety-related limits for specific process 
parameters (e.g., temperatures, pressures).  The plant 
ensures that the process is maintained within these limits 
using reliable process controls and monitoring instruments, 
emergency relief systems and two stage scrubber system, 
highly trained personnel, and protective instrument systems 
(e.g., emergency shutdo 
wn systems). 
The plant also maintains technical documents that provide 
information about the design and construction of process 
equipment.  This information includes materials of 
construction, design pressure and temperature ratings, and 
electrical rating of equipment.  This information, in 
combination with written procedures and trained personnel, 
provides a basis for establishing inspection and maintenance 
activities, as well as for evaluating proposed process and 
facility changes to ensure that safety features in the 
process are not compromised. 
1.6.5  Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
The Fort Worth Witco plant has a comprehensive program to 
help ensure that hazards associated with the various process 
are identified and controlled.  Within this program, each 
new and altered process is systematically examined to 
identify hazards and ensure the adequate controls are in 
place to manage these hazards. 
Methodologies used to perform these evaluations include the 
rd and operability study (HAZOP) and the What- 
If/Checklist technique.  These analyses are conducted using 
cross-functional teams having operations and engineering 
expertise.   These teams identify and evaluate hazard 
scenarios , ranking each scenario's risk level with respect 
to event likelihood and severity.  The team then evaluates 
prevention and mitigation measures and makes recommendations 
for additional prevention and/or mitigation measures if they 
are judged necessary. 
The findings and recommendations of the team are reviewed by 
local managers for resolution.  Implementation of 
recommendations in response to PHA findings is based on a 
relative risk ranking assigned by the team.  This ranking 
helps ensure that potential accident scenarios assigned the 
highest risk receive immediate attention.  All approved 
mitigation options in response to PHA team findings are 
tracked until they are completed.  The final resolution of 
each finding is documented and retained. 
To help ensure that the process controls and/or process 
hazards do not eventually deviate significantly from those 
originally planned for in design safety features, Witco's 
Fort Worth Plant periodically updates and revalidates the 
hazard analysis studies.   These periodic reviews are 
conducted at least every 5 years for covered processes and 
will be conducted at this frequency until the process is no 
longer operating.   Findings and recommendations from these 
updates are documented and retained.   Recommendations made 
by the team updating or revalidating the PHA are again 
reviewed and resolved by management review with final 
resolution being documented and retained. 
1.6.6  Operating Procedures 
Witco's Fort Worth plant maintains written procedures that 
address various modes of process operations, such as (1) 
initial startup, (2) normal operations, (3) temporary 
operations, (4) emergency shutdown, (5) normal shutdown, and 
(6) startup following maintenance activitie 
s or following an 
emergency shutdown.   Operating procedures are used as a 
reference by experienced operators and a training resource 
in training new operators.  These procedures are 
periodically reviewed and certified as current and accurate 
annually.   Operating procedures are kept current and 
accurate by revising them as necessary to reflect changes 
made through the management of change process.  When 
creating or reviewing operating procedures, a team of 
personnel review and comment on the draft's accuracy and 
completeness.  Procedures are available to operators and 
other personnel in work areas where process operations are 
carried out. 
1.6.7  Training 
Training is an essential part of the skills development 
program used for qualifying employees involved in operating 
a process.   New employees receive initial training in plant 
rules and safety policies, process overviews, chemical and 
process hazards present at this location, safe work 
practices, and basic emer 
gency response procedures. 
Following classroom orientation, the new employee begins co- 
worker training with an experienced operator and a review of 
operating procedures applicable to his job.   At the 
conclusion of this co-worker training period, the new 
employee is evaluated to ensure he has acquired the skills 
and knowledge necessary to safely and successfully do his 
job.   To supplement and reinforce job knowledge and skills, 
all employees undergo refresher training at regular 
intervals.  Refresher training frequency ranges from each 
year to once every three years.   Training is documented and 
understanding is verified using oral and written tests, 
performance observation and other means which objectively 
demonstrate understanding. 
1.6.8  Contractor Safety Program 
Witco employees contractors to  perform special construction 
projects or supplement the maintenance workforce when 
needed.  All contractors receive some level of orientation 
training depending on the 
proximity of their work to other 
process activities or hazards.   Contractors are selected in 
consideration of their safety programs and performance. 
They are made aware of basic plant rules and safety 
policies, workplace hazards in the area where they will 
work, safe work practices applicable to the work they will 
perform, and basic emergency response procedures.   During 
the initial orientation, contract employees are instructed 
to report any hazards their work will create or that they 
discover during the course of their work.   Contractors are 
periodically evaluated to ensure they are fulfilling their 
safety obligations. 
1.6.9  Pre-startup Safety Reviews 
Witco personnel perform PSSRs for any facility modification 
that requires a change in process safety information.   This 
generally means following a change  in a  process  or 
following the construction of a new process.  The purpose of 
the PSSR is to ensure that safety features, procedures, 
personnel and equip 
ment are appropriately prepared for 
startup prior to place the equipment into service.  This 
review provides one additional check to verify that 
construction is in accordance with design specification and 
that all supporting systems are operationally ready. 
Applicable checklists are used to verify all aspects of 
readiness.  A PSSR involves field verification of  equipment 
fabrication and installation, and serves to assure that 
other accident prevention program requirements are properly 
1.6.10  Mechanical Integrity 
Witco's Fort Worth Plant assures the mechanical integrity of 
critical operations equipment such as pressure vessels, 
storage tanks, piping systems, relief and vent systems, 
controls, pumps and safety systems through its mechanical 
integrity program.   The basic aspects of the program 
include:  (1) training, (2) developing written procedures, 
(3) performing inspections and tests, (4) correcting 
identified deficiencies, and (5) applying qualit 
y assurance 
measures.  In combination, these activities form a system 
that maintains the mechanical integrity of the process. 
Maintenance personnel receive training in (1) overviews of 
the process, (2) safety and health hazards, (3) applicable 
maintenance procedures, (4) emergency response plans, and 5) 
applicable safe work practices to help ensure that they can 
perform their jobs in a safe manner.  Equipment 
deficiencies, once identified, are corrected prior to 
further operation of the equipment, or a management team 
will review the use of the equipment and determine what 
actions are necessary to ensure the safe operation of the 
As part of the mechanical integrity program, quality 
assurance measures are incorporated into equipment purchases 
and repairs.  This helps ensure that new equipment is 
suitable for its intended use and that proper materials and 
spare parts are used when repairs are made. 
1.6.11  Safe Work Practices 
Witco's Fort Worth Plant 
employs widely accepted safety work 
practices as a matter of daily routine.   Those safe work 
practices used include (1) lockout procedures for control of 
hazardous energy, (2) entry/exit control procedures for 
maintenance, laboratory, contractor, and support personnel, 
(3) linebreaking/opening process equipment procedures, (4) a 
hotworks permit program to control possible ignition 
sources, and (5) a permit-required confined space entry 
procedure.  These procedures are used by all personnel 
involved in both user and non-user maintenance activities. 
1.6.12  Management of Change 
The Witco management of change program is a system to review 
and evaluate changes to process chemistry, operating 
conditions or limits, equipment, and procedures to prevent 
unexpected adverse impacts.    The management of change 
program uses a quantitative risk assessment to determine the 
significance of the change.   This risk level assessment 
determines the levels of authorization required 
to approve 
the action.   Design review checklists are used to evaluate 
different types of changes to prevent new hazards being 
created or equipment changes which are not suited to the 
service as it exists in the process.   Another important 
feature of the management of change program is that is 
verifies and documents that procedures, records and 
equipment information are updated and that personnel 
affected by the change are notified and trained in the 
1.6.13  Incident Investigation 
Witco requires that all incidents which result in, or could 
reasonably have resulted in,  the release of a hazardous 
material, a fire or explosion in a covered process area, 
major property damage, adverse environmental impact, or 
serious personal injury be reported and promptly 
investigated.  By investigating accidents and near-misses, 
important lessons are learned and corrective actions can be 
used to prevent future similar events.   Incident 
investigations are documented and 
recommendations tracked to 
their completion.  Incident investigation reports are 
retained for at least 5 years to facilitate their use during 
PHA updates and revalidation. 
1.6.14   Compliance Audits 
To assure that the goals of the accident prevention programs 
are met, program performance is periodically evaluated in 
the form of compliance audits.   An audit team reviews 
records and documents to determine the degree of program 
compliance.  Compliance audits are conducted at least every 
3 years.   Audit team findings are documented and presented 
to plant management for resolution.  Corrective actions 
taken in response to audit findings are tracked until they 
are complete.   The two most recent audit reports are 
1.7   Chemical-Specific Prevention Steps 
The risks associated with the  processes described earlier 
in this executive summary require proper management to 
prevent accidental releases of regulated substances in this 
1.7.1  Specialize 
d Safety Features 
Witco's Fort Worth plant has engineered safety features on 
those units which process highly hazardous chemicals to (1) 
Prevent a release through early warning of impending upsets, 
and/or (2) reduce the consequences of (mitigate) a release. 
The following types of safety features are used in these 
processes:  Release Prevention Systems 
1.   High level probes with alarms 
2.   Flow controllers with automatic shutoffs 
3.   Pressure relief devices on piping, tanks, and reactor 
4.   Check valves to prevent reverse flow through piping 
5.   High temperature and pressure warning systems on the 
reactor vessels  Release Containment/Control 
1.   Dikes and diversion containment which contain spills 
 and limit the surface area of the spill. 
2.   Manual valves to permit isolation of the process if 
necessary.  Release Mitigation 
1.   Employees trained to respond as hazardous materials 
2.   Contracted off-sit 
e emergency responders available to 
 support employee teams if needed 
3.   Specialized personal protective equipment (e.g., 
chemical protective clothing, self-contained breathing 
1.8  Five-Year Accident History 
Witco's Fort Worth Plant has not had any accidental releases 
during the past five years which meet the criteria for an 
accidental release per 40CFR68.42. 
1.9  Emergency Response Program Information 
Witco's Fort Worth plant maintains a written emergency 
response plan designed to protect worker and public safety 
as well as the environment during an emergency.  The plan 
consists of procedures for responding to a release of 
formaldehyde, including the possibility of a fire or 
explosion.  These procedures address notification and 
emergency signals, specific containment actions, and proper 
first aid and medical treatment for exposures, evacuation 
plans and accounting for personnel after an evacuation, 
notification of local emergency response agen 
cies and the 
public if a release occurs, and post-incident cleanup and 
decontamination requirements.  In addition, the plant has 
procedures that address maintenance, inspection, and testing 
of emergency response equipment.  All personnel entering the 
Witco Fort Worth Plant receive some level of orientation 
which contains instruction in emergency signals and actions 
to be taken during an emergency.   Specific employees are 
trained to Hazardous Materials Technician level for actively 
responding to hazardous materials emergencies.  These 
personnel are sufficiently trained to deal with most 
hazardous materials emergencies which might occur in this 
facility.  In the event of more serious emergencies, the 
same personnel are trained and prepared to assist the 
efforts of other emergency response personnel in a variety 
of support roles.  All employees are trained as first 
responders at the awareness level and in procedures for 
cleaning up small spills based on their work assign 
Overall emergency response programs are coordinated with the 
Fort Worth Fire Department.  This coordination includes 
briefings and information sharing to address specific 
concerns in the event of an incident at the plant.  The 
Witco Fort Worth Plant has around-the-clock communications 
capability with the Fort Worth Fire Department.   This 
department has the capability to communicate to all state, 
federal and county agencies and may draw on whatever 
resources or equipment are needed to effectively manage 
emergency operations (i.e., firefighting equipment, 
manpower, ambulances, hospitals, law enforcement, and HAZMAT 
operations).  This provides a means of notifying the public 
of an incident, if necessary, as well as facilitating a 
quick response to an incident.   Witco's Fort Worth Plant 
conducts drills annually to assess personnel readiness, 
proficiency and the effectiveness of emergency response 
1.10  Planned Changes to Improve Safety 
Witco's Fort  
Worth Plant is constantly striving to improve 
process safety, quality, and efficiency.   Several 
noteworthy improvements scheduled for the future include 
z    Improvements to the tank truck unloading station which 
 involve installation of  dedicated pump and hose systems 
 which significantly reduce the risk of an off-loading mishap 
z    Spill containment area reductions which reduces the 
 surface area size of a spill in off-loading areas.  Reduced 
 surface area significantly reduces any resulting vapor 
 emissions in the event of an emergency. 
1 Quantity represents formaldehyde minus water solution with 
1% methanol. 
2 OSHA Interpretation, Patricia K. Clark, OSHA Directorate 
of Compliance Programs, July 28, 1992 and CPL 2-2.45A CH-1 
(Dec 13, 1994)
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